TERRORGRAM'S FIRST SAINT Analyzing Accelerationist Terrorism in Bratislava AUTHORED BY Julia Kupper Kacper Rękawek Matthew Kriner Content Warning This report contains content and direct quotes from terrorist materials and suicide notes which may be inappropriate for some audiences or cause distress. We have left the original text for academic purposes. Table of Contents Executive Summary Forensic Analysis of the Attack and its Aftermath Cultural Context and Family Background Forensic Linguistic Framework Targeted Violence Manifesto Pre-Attack Twitter Feed Suicide Note Post-Attack Twitter Feed 4Chan Interactions Forensic Authorship Analysis The Accelerationism Influence Mobilizing Concepts The Role of Terrorgram A Grim Postscript and Conclusion 1 3 4 8 9 16 19 21 22 24 27 32 33 35 Executive Summary On October 12, 2022, 19-year-old Juraj Krajčík perpetrated a terrorist attack that killed two people and injured one outside a LGBTQ+ bar in the center of Bratislava, Slovakia. Krajčík was deeply motivated by the militant accelerationism movement, Terrorgram (a prominent space within Telegram's far-right ecosystem), and the so-called Saints Culture. Krajčík’s attack and manifesto now exist as the clearest exemplar of an accelerationist attacker since Brenton Tarrant. Key findings: The perpetrator was inspired by previous lone-actor terrorists, namely those belonging to the Saints Culture, who conducted similar offenses: ● ● ● ● Krajčík’s manifesto claims Brenton Tarrant and John Earnest served as catalysts for the Bratislava attack, whose manifestos, live-stream, and acts of violence in March and April 2019 ostensibly animated the attacker to begin his soft preparations for the attack. This long-term influence is also referred to as the copycat effect, and involves the imitation of both the acts and actors. According to Krajčík’s manifesto, the short-term, viral contagion reaction was supposedly stimulated by Payton Gendron’s manifesto, live-stream, and act of violence in May 2022, after which the assailant purportedly began the concrete planning of his attack. Tarrant and Gendron’s writings inspired Krajčík’s manifesto, as it references their names, cites textual elements, and copies structural components from these previous communications. Krajčík’s manifesto and act of violence will likely incite further violence and inspire sympathizers to conduct copycat attacks in the form of lone-actor terrorist incidents with a mass casualty intent. On the basis of linguistic patterns that were identified in the different sets of language evidence, we suggest that Juraj Krajčík did not author the manifesto and certain tweets in their entirety but that a second, unknown author assisted him in writing some of the texts and/or provided language: ● ● Indicators include inconsistencies in writing styles between and across the different text types of evidence authored in English. We suggest that some sections of the manifesto and certain tweets appear to be more consistent with the author profile of a native English speaker, who is possibly older, well-educated, and from the United States, rather than a 19-year-old native Slovak speaker who never resided outside of his home country. We suspect that this unknown author is deeply connected to the Terrorgram network, indicating a sharp change in Terrorgram dynamics with accelerationist attackers; instead of the stochastic terrorist approach they have conducted thus far, the Terrorgram community appears to be shifting to a command-and-control functionality. 1 Krajčík’s manifesto and Twitter feed introduce new elements that reveal deeper connections to the militant accelerationism ecosystem than previous attackers: ● ● ● ● The perpetrator and Terrorgram displayed a bi-directional relationship, which resulted in the 19-year-old being anointed as “Terrorgram’s first Saint.” Krajčík included explicit references to the Saints Culture, the “Terrorgram Collective,” and associated Terrorgram publications, such as The Hard Reset, in his manifesto. Krajčík’s strong endorsement of militant accelerationist tactics for furthering societal collapse in his written texts exceeds even Tarrant’s inclusion and advocacy of accelerationism, making him the most explicit accelerationist attacker to date. Additionally, Krajčík’s manifesto contains specific iconography associated with deeper strategic-level understandings of militant accelerationism not previously seen in manifestos. We suggest that Krajčík’s radicalization to violence and his Saints-inspired attack in Slovakia are more Americanized than Slovakian: ● ● Krajčík grew up in a politicized household with his father serving as a parliamentary candidate for a political party which, while not positioning itself on the far-right, espouses anti-liberal and anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric. The tone and focus of the perpetrator’s written content is much more fixated on the contemporary American far-right violent extremist zeitgeist (e.g., anti-LGBTQ+) than on a Slovakian context. Krajčík will likely represent a new strain of the Saints Culture contagion that has consistently generated mass shooters and far-right terrorists infected with a shared set of hate-fueled ideological worldviews. This report contextualizes Krajčík’s role within the accelerationist pantheon of so-called Saints, and illustrates why he should be considered an innovator versus a consumer or output of the Terrorgram community and militant accelerationism ecosystem. Through a multi-disciplinary approach that combines the authors’ unique skill sets in terrorism, international security, threat assessment, and forensic linguistics, this report analyzes the incident on several levels: a detailed analysis of the attack and its aftermath; the cultural and familial context of Krajčík’s pre-attack life; a forensic linguistic analysis of the language evidence, which includes a targeted violence manifesto, a suicide note, more than 250 tweets, and several 4chan comments; and Krajčík’s relationship with accelerationism and the influence of accelerationist milieus—like Terrorgram—on his radicalization and mobilization to violence. 2 Forensic Analysis of the Attack and its Aftermath Juraj Krajčík reportedly left his home around 04:00 p.m. on October 12, 2022, and was captured on CCTV cameras outside Tepláreň bar,1 the target site of the terrorist attack in Bratislava, Slovakia’s capital, more than two hours later. The shooter waited behind the wall of a nearby building until he opened fire with a handgun around 07:00 p.m., reloaded and came back to fire more bullets. As it was a relatively warm night, his victims sat outside the bar;2 the deceased were two guests, both members of the local LGBTQ+ community, and the wounded victim was a waitress that worked at the establishment.3 The attack was carried out with a firearm belonging to Krajčík’s father, who expressed his surprise as to how his son was able to retrieve the gun from the safe.4 In comparison to other recent terrorists associated with the Saints culture, the shooter did not attempt to live-stream his attack, nor did he wear tactical gear or had written the names of previous perpetrators or victims of opposing acts of violence on his weapon. After the attack, the perpetrator ran uphill on Zámocká (Castle Street), leading from the Old Town towards the Slovak parliament.5 The street sits at the intersection with Židovská (Jewish Street), highlighting the fact that the area used to be populated by Jewish inhabitants of Pressburg, the Germanic name of Bratislava. The area also houses multiple Jewish cultural sites (which could have been targets), such as the Museum of Jewish Culture or the Chatam Sofer memorial, on the other side of the Bratislava Castle.6 The shooter arrived back at home relatively quickly and then proceeded to have a heated argument with his parents, who, in the words of the Slovak police president, found out he carried out something “horrible.” 7 During the argument, he managed to lock them in a room and extracted a second gun from his father’s safe and fled the house. It was the last time anyone would see Juraj Krajčík alive. The police had supposedly been told about the offender’s presence in the family’s home by one of the passers-by, but their so-called “call taker” failed to properly log the information extracted Tepláreň bar translates to “PowerPlant” with “teply” (warm) being a slang expression for a homosexual in Slovak. 2 Michal Hvorecky, “Matúš a Juraj, Obete Extrémizmu,” Denník N (Denník N, October 18, 2022), https://dennikn.sk/3054429/gejovia-matus-a-juraj-obete-extremizmu/?ref=tit. 1 3 One of the authors spoke to LGBTQ+ colleagues residing in Bratislava, who confirmed that they knew the victims. Marian Kotleba, “Tragická Udalosť Ktorá SA Udiala 12. Októbra 2022 Pred Podnikom Tepláreň v Bratislave Na Zámockej Ul,” YouTube (Rádio Kompas, October 18, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0gtGI6BSMDI. See ‘34:09’ 5 Pravda, “Video: Zbabelá Poprava Na Zámockej. Juraj K. Vraždil Chladnokrvne a OD CHRBTA,” Pravda.sk (Pravda, October 14, 2022), https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/643649-video-zbabelapoprava-na-zamockej-juraj-k-vrazdil-chladnokrvne-a-od-chrbta/?utm_source=pravda&utm_medium=hpbox&utm_campaign=shp_3clanok_box. 6 Museum of Jewish Culture & Chatam Sofer memorial. 7 “Vražda Na Zámockej: Strelec Išiel Po Útoku Domov K Rodičom,” Aktuality.sk (Aktuality Slovakia, October 13, 2022), https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/Dn4CVCM/vrazda-na-zamockej-strelec-isiel-po-utokudomov-k-rodicom/; Monika Tódová, “Policajný Prezident Hamran: Gejovia to Majú V Polícii Ťažšie (+ Video),” Denník N (Denník N, November 4, 2022), https://dennikn.sk/3090390/policajny-prezidenthamran-gejovia-to-maju-v-policii-tazsie-video/?ref=list. 4 3 from the member of the public in the system. 8 Thus, the police units were not alerted about this crucial piece of information and precious time was lost. At the same time, the police were unable to communicate with the cell phone provider of the perpetrator and could not gather more information on his whereabouts. This unnamed provider is apparently the only operating one in Slovakia that does not have 24/7 support staff that would be on standby to communicate with external parties in emergency situations. Nonetheless, around 2:00 a.m., seven hours after the shooting, the police reached Krajčík’s home and found a suicide note of which one part was made public. The targeted bar, Tepláreň, is situated around 1.5 mi (2.4 km) from the place where the shooter’s body was discovered the next morning, itself being relatively adjacent to his home address. This suggests that after the shooting, Krajčík was most likely able to either walk further up the hill towards Slavin—the memorial and cemetery for the fallen Soviet soldiers—then descend, cross the busy multi-lane freeway leading towards North-Western Bratislava and the train tracks, and then climb another hill. Alternatively, he could have immediately descended towards the city center and then walked past the presidential palace and Bratislava’s central station before climbing the hill on which his family lived and where he later committed suicide. Regardless of the route he chose on the night of October 12-13, he spent hours on the run as his body was only found 12 hours after his attack, at 07:00 a.m. the next day. During that time, as one of the co-authors was told by journalists on the ground, the police pushed its forces towards downtown and especially in the direction of the imposing SNP Bridge, as they allegedly received a tip that Krajčík might be planning a suicide by jumping off the structure, which would partly explain the fire brigade and police river patrols that were seen shortly after the shooting on the nearby Danube.9 Moreover, the police might have done so to put themselves in between the perpetrator and additional, potential victims, which were to be found in the bars, clubs, and pubs downtown. These are concentrated in the area downhill from Tepláreň and also on the way from the bar towards the SNP Bridge. However, as this was happening, the shooter was effectively walking away from the city center to an area not far from it; his final destination was situated on a hill separated from the center of Bratislava by the busy multi-lane freeway and train tracks. At approximately the same time law enforcement was searching his family home and discovered the suicide note, the wannabe Saint spent his last hours exchanging unsettling messages and posting to social media on a grassy hill not far from the family home. Cultural Context and Family Background Juraj Krajčík’s family belonged to Slovakia’s upper middle class, and the perpetrator grew up in the Kramare district, relatively close to the city center and one of the capital’s more affluent A call taker is a police officer in the operations’ room that is tasked with answering calls from tipsters. 9 Most SNP, less than 0.6 mi (1 km) away from the crime scene; Jaroslav Novák, “Zamaskovaný Vrah Pozoroval Svoje Obete Desiatky Minút. Zastrelil Ich Zbraňou, Ktorú Mal Vybavenú Laserom,” Otvori članak u StoryEditor-u (HNonline.sk, October 13, 2022), https://hnonline.sk/slovensko/96046014zamaskovany-vrah-pozoroval-svoje-obete-desiatky-minut-zastrelil-ich-zbranou-ktoru-mal-vybavenulaserom?showPhotoGallery. 8 4 neighborhoods. His father, also named Juraj Krajčík, was a self-employed businessman whereas his mother stayed at home to look after the two children (a rarity in urban Slovakia). After the attack, the shooter’s father painted a picture of his son’s trouble-free childhood and of a “sensitive and honest” teenager, who never gave his parents a hard time and was trained in karate.10 He was reportedly an “intellectual,” never drank or smoked, was always home by nightfall, and spent every weekend on outings with his parents and sister. At the same time, the younger Krajčík shifted between two elite schools for “exceptionally talented” students in Bratislava. Krajčík Senior claimed his son was bullied at the first school and thus, the parents decided to move him to another elite institution. Krajčík’s father looked down on the first school, apparently because it was full of children of “financial but not the intellectual elite,” which “cost him much” in tuition fees—a sign of upper middle-class status in Slovakia.11 He praised the second school, as it allegedly helped reverse his son’s decline as a student and enabled him to find new friends. Upon his transfer, the school was said to have offered Krajčík Junior psychological assistance, in addition to supposedly working with a second external psychologist. His mental state was said to have improved but, in the words of the school’s principal, the COVID-19 pandemic upended this process because students were pushed towards online tuition.12 Although he reportedly displayed no signs of radicalization into extremism after the pandemic, he continued to have problems with making friends and “was conflict prone, with displays of fury.” 13 All of the above, however, fails to explain how and why a talented Slovak teenager evolved into a far-right terrorist who murdered two people in downtown Bratislava. According to some sources, the answer lies in the fact that “he was growing up immersed in hatred since his birth.”14 In the words of one of the most well-informed observers of the extremist scene in Slovakia, the killer grew up in an environment conducive to radicalization. His family members displayed fondness for disinformation sources or the “alternative media,” and were apparently leaving trails of their “poison in words” towards minorities on their social media profiles. At the same time, the perpetrator’s father was supposedly “labeling everything that deviated from his pro-Russian and [Stefan] Harabin [more on him below] vision of the world as fascist.”15 Despite belonging to the country’s financial elite and having the desire for his son to become part of the intellectual elite, Krajčík Senior politically drifted towards a party with a populist and antimainstream message. During the 2020 elections, he supported the party Homeland (Slovak: Vlast’) and later claimed that he was on the party’s electoral list “to make up the numbers” for PR Ibid. Footnote #4. (Interview with attacker’s father) Ibid. 12 “Radikalizoval Sa AJ v Škole? Riaditeľka Prehovorila O Strelcovi Zo Zámockej: Počas Pandémie Nechodil K Psychológovi!,” (Topky.sk, October 19, 2022), https://www.topky.sk/cl/10/2400371/Radikalizoval-sa-aj-v-skole--Riaditelka-prehovorila-o-strelcovi-zoZamockej--Pocas-pandemie-nechodil-k-psychologovi-. 13 Petra Hollá, “Nadaný Žiak, Ale Nešťastný a Bez Priateľov: Vrah Zo Zámockej Vyrastal v Nenávisti Od Kolísky! Slovensko Sa Musí Poučiť,” Topky.sk (Topsky/Zoznam, October 14, 2022), https://www.topky.sk/cl/10/2397237/Nadany-ziak--ale-nestastny-a-bez-priatelov--Vrah-zo-Zamockejvyrastal-v-nenavisti-od-kolisky--Slovensko-sa-musi-poucit. 14 Ibid. 15 Radovan Bránik, “KVETY ZLA - SLOVENSKÁ EDÍCIA,” (Facebook, October 12, 2022), https://www.facebook.com/radovan.branik/posts/1413032122554085. 10 11 5 reasons.16 He also allegedly decided to mute his political activities during the electoral campaign, as his son was said to have been worried about being bullied at school due his father’s political choices.17 Vlast’ was hardly a popular choice for Bratislava’s residents and Krajčík Senior received 239 votes in the whole country of more than 5 million inhabitants, with the entire party receiving just 84,000 votes during these elections. 18 Krajčík Senior’s Facebook profile, still operational as of March 2023 with more than 1,400 followers, seems to have been established with the view of raising his profile before and during the electoral campaign for the 2020 parliamentary elections.19 Its posts start in early 2020 and feature a string of pronouncements, photos, screengrabs and videos, which give us a sneak peek of Krajčík Senior’s worldview, as he almost solely concentrated on political issues while posting from his profile.20 A picture of an individual fully invested in the worldview and ideology of Vlasť party emerges: ● ● ● ● ● ● Anti-mainstream: he called the post-2020 Slovak government an “[Igor] Matovič junta with a Soros escort”;21 Anti-liberal: Slovak’s liberal president, Zuzana Čaputová, is called “Soros barbie of the Pezinok junkyard”;22 Pro-Russian: celebrating the anniversary of the victory of World War II by laying flowers at Slavin in Bratislava, a memorial monument and cemetery of the fallen Soviet soldiers while wearing St. George’s Ribbons, a symbol of, among others, pro-Russian “separatists” in Ukraine; Pan-Slavic, anti-American and anti-NATO: shared graphics that depicts Slovak parliamentarians who voted for the defense agreement with the United States, signed in early 2022, as “traitors to the homeland”;23 Anti-Covid restrictions: these are compared to “fascism;” Anti-Ukrainian after February 24, 2022: called the Slovak minister for foreign affairs “Ukrainian.” 16The whole of Slovakia is considered to be a single electoral district that elects 150 MPs and has to consist of a full slate of candidates, i.e., as many candidates as there are seats in the parliament. Krajčík Senior was candidate number 50 on Vlast’s list.; Ibid. Footnote #4 17 Ibid. Footnote #4. (Interview with attacker’s father) 18 “Juraj Krajčík - Kandidát Pre Voľby 2020: Aktuality,” (Aktuality.sk, February 29, 2020), https://volby.aktuality.sk/volby-2020/kandidat/juraj-krajcik/vlast-50/. 19 Juraj Krajčík, “Profile - Juraj Krajčík,” (Facebook, March 2023), https://www.facebook.com/juraj.krajcik.7505. 20 One of the authors maintains screengrabs of the discussed posts, which can be provided upon request for research purposes. 21 Igor Matovič’s political party O’LANO (Ordinary People and Independent Figures) won the 2020 parliamentary election. Consequently, Matovic became the prime minister of Slovakia but stepped down from his post in 2021, due to internal conflicts in his center-right coalition. He was replaced by the thenminister of finance, and a prominent member of his political party, Eduard Heger. 22 Caputova is originally from Pezinok and as a lawyer she fought legal battles related to the opening of a junkyard in her hometown. 23 Michal Katuška, “Tu Býva VLASTIZRADCA. Opozícia Hecuje Davy Proti Koaličným Poslancom,” domov.sme.sk (SME.sk, February 11, 2022), https://domov.sme.sk/c/22839276/obranna-zmluva-s-usaopozicia-hecuje-davy-proti-poslancom.html. 6 We argue that Krajčík Senior must have been quite close with the party leader, Štefan Harabin— former Justice Minister and Supreme Court Judge—with whom he traveled to events in the same car and filmed him at anti-Covid protests. In his posts, Krajčík Senior also mimicked Harabin’s public discourse, which mixes pomposity and inflammatory language (for instance, the aforementioned “barbie” reference and calling political opponents “idiots” and “traitors”), and cast himself as a victim of a string of nefarious plots. All of this is then used as an excuse for the likes of Harabin, or Krajčík Senior for that matter, to go on a relentless rhetorical (or literary) offense, which sees political opponents degraded and diminished. The blows are aimed at the center-right government of the country, but Slovakia’s opposition also receives its share of criticism; the opposition itself is a mixture of seemingly social-democratic parties, whose voters often have what is referred to as “patriotic” views and outright far-right political outfits. In effect, such an approach is classic Vlasť—a populist, nativist, anti-mainstream party led by the former Chief of Justice of the country’s Supreme Court. The party is stringently opposed to the country’s current establishment (“they stole our homeland”), but does not see itself as a far-right or even nationalist outlet. Instead, Vlast’ prefers the term “patriotic” and proudly adheres to elements of Slovakia’s (post-) communist legacy, such as pan-Slavism and pro-Russian stances. Party members also positively view the 1944 anti-Nazi Slovak National Uprising (Slovenské národné povstanie, SNP) and clash with the likes of Marian Kotleba’s Ľudová strana Naše Slovensko (People’s Party Our Slovakia, L’SNS), a long-term dominant political force on the Slovak far-right, over their respective and differing interpretations of World War II history. Like most political parties, Vlast’ eschews political violence and desires recognition from voters. However, the party partly fails in this mission due to its leaders' aggressive and confrontational discourse. As such, Harabin calls the Slovak president a “ukro-Nazi”24 (i.e., a Ukrainian-Nazi or “fraudster lawyer”25), and a “co-architect and long-term subconscious spreader of hateful extremism.”26 He also opinionates that she and George Soros prepare terrorist attacks against the Slovaks to reduce the population, so that the country could be reduced to a pawn of the supranational institutions (NATO and EU), firmly anchored in the West. 27 Vlast’ believes that NATO and the EU engage in terrorism, largely through their “forcing of an LGBTQ+ agenda upon normal people,” which only strengthens hatred in the land. They allegedly do not see that their “liberalism, with its satanist sexual practices, equals liquidation of human civilization.”28 All of this is done to their own citizens and is supported by a faction of the community, “enamored by the Štefan Harabin, “Čaputovej Ideológiu Ukronacizmu Prevzala I Mediálna Rada S CIEĽOM Zlikvidovať Rádio Frontinus,” (YouTube, November 11, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aYmuVJ4wSdg. 25 Štefan Harabin, “Čaputová Spoluarchitekt a Dlhodobý Podprahový Šíriteľ Nenávistného Extrémizmu.,” (YouTube, October 14, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=seTTTgzRCJg. 26 Ibid. 27 It must be mentioned here that Harabin’s political failures are also the end result of his inability or lack of preparedness to bury the hatchets with other “patriotic” forces on the Slovak far-right, namely Kotleba’s L’SNS, with whom he was said to have been in talks over forming a joint party list before the 2020 parliamentary election. However, Harabin has been much more successful during the 2019 presidential election, which saw him land in third place with 14.4% of votes. In short, he maintains a political brand (more than 300,000 votes in 2019) which does not translate well into the party politics of Slovakia (Vlasť only received 84,000 votes in 2020). 24 Štefan Harabin, “Zradcovská Klika V Riadení Štátu, Ktorá Vedie Ľudí Do Záhuby a Do Nežiaducej Biedy, Musí Skončiť.,” (YouTube, October 25, 2022), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_wUjRoA-xXc. 28 7 US, EU and the NGOs,” people who “dress like monkeys and eat things we feed pigs with.” They are advised to better “kill themselves so that their stupid kids would not shame us.” 29 It is worth noting that all of these pronouncements are taken from Harabin’s videos shared on his recently restored YouTube channel,30 which were published after the terrorist attack perpetrated by a son of one of his party’s candidates had occurred. In one of these videos, Harabin expressed condolences to the families of the individuals killed in the attack but then quickly pivoted towards blaming the country’s liberal president and her proponents for the “phenomenon of growing manifestations of hate” in the country. In his worldview, it is his opponents who are to blame for this state of affairs. One, of course, cannot be sure about the extent to which such views were fully on display in the shooter’s home. However, if his father’s claims on the family being close and spending a lot of time together are true, especially during weekends attending places such as Soviet cemeteries and memorials to the SNS uprising, then it is likely that politics might have been discussed at home. Such a reading of the situation is also strengthened by the father’s admission that his son actively wished for him to tone down his political engagement during the electoral campaign, so that he would not face unpleasantries at school from more liberal-minded students. The next section will examine the pre- and post-attack communications via a forensic linguistic framework to conduct an in-depth assessment of Krajčík’s language use in different settings and across various platforms. Forensic Linguistic Framework Linguistics, the scientific and systematic assessment of language, plays an increasingly vital part in tactical, investigative, and forensic domains. Forensic Linguistics, the intersection between linguistics, crime, and law, was of particular value in this case, as it contained a variety of crucial language evidence that was compiled—and partially leaked—before the attack occurred: ● ● ● Targeted violence manifesto: 65-pages, written in English, published on Twitter in the hours leading up to the attack on October 12, 2022; Tweets: approximately 250, written in English, posted between April 22, 2021 and October 12, 2022; Suicide note: 1-page, handwritten in Slovak, discovered by law enforcement at the offender’s parents’ home when they searched his room on October 12, 2022. Furthermore, the perpetrator engaged in post-incident but pre-suicide interactions on Twitter and the imageboard 4chan with several users whilst escaping from the police: ● ● Tweets: 3 written in English, 2 written in Slovak, posted on October 12, 2022; 4chan comments: 18 written in English, 1 written in Slovak, posted on October 12, 2022. Ibid. Footnote #25. (Čaputová spoluarchitekt…) Štefan Harabin, “Štefan Harabin,” (YouTube, n.d.), https://www.youtube.com/c/%C5%A0tefanHarabinsudca/videos. 29 30 8 Targeted Violence Manifesto The Christchurch terrorist attack perpetrated by Brenton Tarrant 31 in March 2019 stands as the principal example of the accelerationist tactic of committing a mass shooter incident tied to the furtherance of an ideological document, frequently referred to as a manifesto; though violent attackers and terrorists, such as Anders Breivik32 and Ted Kaczynski,33 have affixed manifestos to their actions long before accelerationism was conceived. Following Tarrant’s attack and the unparalleled virality of his manifesto, The Great Replacement, the blueprint for a path to Saintdom was crowdsourced into existence, enshrining the tactic within the broader militant accelerationism landscape with the strategic goal of inspiring others towards violent action in the furtherance of societal upheaval and collapse. The contemporary use of manifestos to amplify terrorist attacks from the far-right is firmly situated in the strategic approach of the Saints Culture within the accelerationist Terrorgram community, often as a means of glorifying instances of mass violence and honoring their destructive goals. The Swedish Defence Research Agency has argued that the Saint phenomenon originated in the aftermath of the Christchurch attack when Tarrant was labeled a Saint for having committed an attack against the “enemies” of the white race by his advocates. 34 Later that year, Philip Manshaus35 attempted to conduct a mass shooting at a mosque in Bærum, Norway, and declared in his online attack announcement on Endchan that he was “elected by saint tarrant.”36 Achieving the status of a hero or martyr in these environments is often related to the “kill count” or “high score” of casualties during the incidents. Perpetrators with a high kill count, such as Anders Breivik, Brenton Tarrant, and Robert Bowers, 37 are frequently praised for their successful implementations of their acts of violence on digital platforms, such as imageboards (e.g., 4chan). This predominantly speaks to isolated, unsuccessful young males that are unappreciated in their 31 Brenton Tarrant committed a terrorist attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019, killing 51 and injuring 40; Graham Macklin, “The Christchurch Attacks: Livestream Terror in the Viral Video Age,” Combating Terrorism Center (USMA Westpoint, July 2019), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/christchurchattacks-livestream-terror-viral-video-age/. 32 Anders Breivik committed a terrorist attack in Oslo and Utøya, Norway, in July 2011, killing 77 and injuring 319. 33 Ted Kacynski, also known as the Unabomber, is an American domestic terrorist who mailed or handdelivered a series of bombs that killed 3 people and injured 23 between 1978 and 1995. 34 L. Kaati, K. Cohen, and B. Pelzer, “Heroes and Scapegoats: Right-Wing Extremism in Digital Environments.,” Publications Office of the European Union (Directorate-General for Justice and Consumers, European Commission, July 21, 2021), https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail//publication/49e2ecf2-eae9-11eb-93a8-01aa75ed71a1. 35 Philip Manshaus attempted to commit a terrorist attack in Bærum, Norway, in August 2019, after having killed his step-sister because of her Chinese origin. 36 “Norway - United States Department of State,” U.S. Department of State (Bureau of Counterterrorism, December 1, 2020), https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/norway/. 37 Robert Bowers committed a terrorist attack at a synagogue in Pittsburgh, PA, in October 2018, killing 11 and injuring 7. 9 lifetime, but later revered for their sacrifice by the masses, in this case their sacrifice for “saving the white race.”38 However, as Julia Kupper and Reid Meloy have identified in a previous study on thirty manifestos, the term manifesto is an insufficient description, whereas adding the notion of “targeted violence” provides more clarity for why the text is meant to be consumed and assessed as a part of the attack and the attack’s legacy.39 In alignment with this previous research, Krajčík’s manifesto meets the definition of a targeted violence manifesto (hereinafter TVM): “A written or spoken communication intended to justify an act of violence against a specific target by articulating self-identified grievances, homicidal intentions, and/or extreme ideologies for committing an attack. Generally composed by a single author before the incident occurs, it sometimes expresses beliefs and ideas to violently promote political, religious, or social changes.” 40 The current TVM is a written communication, allegedly composed by a single author and published on the mainstream social media platform Twitter before the incident occurred; it is intended to justify an act of planned violence against a specific target; it articulates self-identified grievances, homicidal intentions, and extreme ideologies justifying an attack; and it displays beliefs and ideas that promote political and social changes through violence. In the tradition of those aspiring to emulate or achieve a vaunted status within the militant accelerationist cultural ecosystem of Saints, in the months leading into his attack, Krajčík is alleged to have developed a TVM that he intended to disseminate to a wider audience. The 65-page document titled A call to arms is written in the English language in a cohesive, coherent, and structured style and is divided into seven sections: “a critical situation;” “about me;” “addressing detractors;” “general thoughts and musings;” “preparations and planning;” “special thanks;” and “final remarks.” Similar to TVMs from notorious predecessors, it contains a variety of graphics, symbols, and pictures; for example, the first page includes a Sonnenrad, an ancient European rune used in Old Norse and Celtic cultures, subsequently expropriated in the Nazi era and now an aesthetic feature of neo-fascist accelerationism.41 Other recent far-right terrorists have also embraced the Sonnenrad in their Ari Ben Am and Gabriel Weimann, “Fabricated Martyrs: The Warrior-Saint Icons of Far-Right Terrorism,” (Perspectives on Terrorism, 14, no. 5, October 2020, pp. 130-147), https://www.jstor.org/stable/26940043. 39 Julia Kupper and J. Reid Meloy, “Trap-18 Indicators Validated through the Forensic Linguistic Analysis of Targeted Violence Manifestos,” (Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 2021, pp. 174-199), https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000165. 40 Ibid. 41 This symbol is engraved in the floor of the Wewelsburg in Germany, a castle complex that was used as a central Schutzstaffel (SS) assembly place, concentration camp and Gestapo execution site after it was acquired by Heinrich Himmler in 1933. Himmler was fascinated by the symbol’s esoteric nature and sought to exploit that ancient Germanic linkage for the SS. For more, see: Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, The Occult Roots of Nazism: Secret Aryan Cults and Their Influence on Nazi Ideology (New York: New York University Press, 2004), https://nyupress.org/9780814730607/occult-roots-of-nazism/. 38 10 TVMs and incorporated the emblem by placing it on gear utilized during their attacks—e.g., Brenton Tarrant placed the rune on his backpack and Payton Gendron 42 on his tactical vest.43 The Contagion and Copycat Effect in the TVM In a different study led by Julia Kupper, the language evidence produced by ten far-right lone actors before and during their terroristic attacks revealed the presence of content patterns and shared structural components across their respective TVMs and live-streams, attack announcements on online platforms, and writings on equipment used during the incidents. We detected several forms of this interconnectivity in the manifesto associated with the Bratislava attack, which indicates that the author studied previous terrorist communications and used them as a template for writing his own TVM. This is also called the contagion or copycat effect, two concepts that should be divided:44 “Contagion refers to an acute period—a hot zone—following a widely publicized mass attack, usually several weeks, and is the imitation of the act. There is an increase in the frequency of targeted violence events before a return to baseline. (...) The term ‘copycat’ refers to a chronic phenomenon, extending over months if not years, and involves the imitation of both the acts and the actors.” Referencing names of notorious same-genre authors that committed similar attacks The author of the Bratislava manifesto makes the following references to Brenton Tarrant: 11x “Tarrant,” 5x “Brenton Tarrant,” 4x “Saint Tarrant,” 1x “Saint Brenton Tarrant” and “Saint Tarrant of Christchurch.” In addition, he alludes to “John Earnest” 45 and “Saint Earnest” once, “Saint Crusius”46 twice, “Payton Gendron” and “Saint Gendron” twice, and “Gendron” once more. However, while this TVM clearly displays the expected references to previous perpetrators, it also introduces a new element: the insertion of the capitalized noun “Saint” before the names of those infamous predecessors. Prior to A call to arms, the glorification of the attackers’ idols—generally the Saints prior far-right terrorist attackers would list—did not explicitly reference them as such in their manifestos. The discussions of becoming a terrorist saint had previously been consigned to specific communities 42 Payton Gendron committed a terrorist attack at a supermarket in Buffalo, NY, in May 2022, killing 10 and injuring 3. 43 Matthew Kriner, Erica Barbarossa, and Isabela Bernardo, “The Buffalo Terrorist Attack: Situating Lone Actor Violence into the Militant Accelerationism Landscape,” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (The Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism, July 2022), https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/sites/www.middlebury.edu.institute/files/202207/The%20Buffalo%20Terrorist%20Attack.pdf?fv=8vaUrIkZ. 44 Julia Kupper et al., “The Contagion and Copycat Effect in Transnational Far-Right Terrorism: An Analysis of Language Evidence,” (Perspectives on Terrorism, 16, no. 4, August 1, 2022, pp. 4-26), https://www.jstor.org/stable/27158149. 45 John Earnest committed a terrorist attack at a synagogue in Poway, CA, in April 2019, killing 1 and injuring 3. 46 Patrick Crusius committed a terrorist attack at a supermarket in El Paso, TX, in August 2019, killing 23 and injuring 23. 11 on digital platforms, such as imageboards (e.g., 8chan) or the loosely connected Telegram network known as Terrorgram.47 The inclusion of a direct reference to Saints Culture suggests that the author held a more robust association with the specific Terrorgram communities than past lone-actor terrorists, such as Payton Gendron.48 It also indicates a potential evolution in the construction of TVMs that will likely yield additional features for future attackers to emulate, therefore perpetuating the contagion and copycat aspect of the TVM. What was previously an allusion to key figures now serves as a direct response to previous texts from these mediums, and is a crucial feature for the interpretation of the wider impact of this manifesto, as it underlines how the transnational far-right movement has adopted various communication strategies to inspire lone-actor terrorist attacks.49 In returning to the current manifesto, two passages 50 that directly highlight the contagion and copycat effect of previous attackers are: Copycat effect: “It all changed in May 2019. My main two inspirations to carry out an operation, and the main reason I even opened my eyes to the kikes and their plans and decided to resist them, were Brenton Tarrant and John Earnest. In early 2019 (...) I heard that someone massacred people in New Zealand, I was right on it. And that’s where I saw the video for the first time. (...) It was truly unique - maybe it was the fact that it was livestreamed, or the video-game-like view of the whole event, or just the general slaughter of 51 shitskins. The video felt ‘different’ to most other content that I had seen before. Still, at the time, my views didn’t really change much. But I was now aware of this 8chan website, and wondered what made it different. Still, I did not begin using it until a month of so later. After Saint Earnest. When he posted his manifesto on the same website as Saint Tarrant - 8chan - I decided to check out what made the website so special, and from there on I was never the same. In just a few weeks, I learned so much there, it completely changed my view of the world. (...) Since 2019, I have slowly been preparing: gathering targets, researching and monitoring them, reading about tactics and strategies.” Contagion reaction: “The final nail in the coffin was Payton Gendron. His livestream gave me new inspiration, a new impulse to do what had to be done after years of procrastination. And in Gendron, I saw myself – a young man with his whole life ahead, who decided to fight for something bigger than himself, who fought for what he believed in. He had the same feeling that many others Matthew Kriner and Bjørn Ihler, “Analysing Terrorgram Publications: A New Digital Zine,” GNET (Global Network on Extremism and Technology, September 12, 2022), https://gnetresearch.org/2022/09/12/analysing-terrorgram-publications-a-new-digital-zine/; “Terrorgram: A community built on hate,” DFRLab (Digital Forensic Research Lab, April 20, 2020), https://medium.com/dfrlab/terrorgram-a-community-built-on-hate-e02fd59ee329. 48 Gendron did mention a “Saint Sandman” in his Discord logs, though we do not consider this equivalent to a TVM inclusion, as the TVM is the main body of text meant to serve as the attacker’s legacy. 49 Ibid. Footnote #42 - (Contagion and Copycat…) 50 Annotation: Bold is added. 47 12 before him, and he took it. (...) Saint Gendron gave me the final nudge, allowing me to overcome my own indecision and begin seriously working towards carrying out an operation.” These textual samples illustrate that the author’s desire to attack was likely influenced and motivated by previous lone-actor terrorists that conducted similar acts of violence. Tarrant and Earnest’s targeted violence manifestos, live-stream,51 and deeds appear to have been the initial catalysts that triggered an aspiring imitation of the acts and actors in the spring of 2019 (longterm copycat effect). This could also indicate that the perpetrator’s radicalization was slow-burning and not “a pathway that became a runway,” like we have seen in other terrorists that adopted radical positions swiftly.52 More than three years later, in May 2022, Payton Gendron’s targeted violence communications and actions seem to have re-ignited Krajčík’s intent to commit an attack and caused a short-term contagion reaction. Within five months, the perpetrator carried out his terror attack. Copying structural components and citing, rephrasing, or duplicating textual elements from previous manifestos TVMs are the traceable link between the consumption of online content and self-radicalization, which is followed by an implementation of those adopted beliefs into offline, real-world violence. The identification of structural components and textual elements from preceding writings provides evidence that those were studied and used as templates for the next attack. As stated previously, Tarrant’s attack and manifesto have become the blueprint for aspiring Saints to emulate. As such, it is unsurprising that A call to arms heavily copies the structural components of Tarrant’s The Great Replacement, in fact, the first three sections of the manifesto are in accordance with the structure of Tarrant’s writings. In the introduction, the TVM begins with the words “It’s the jews. It’s the jews. It’s the jews,” a direct reference to the preface in Tarrant’s screed: “It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates.” The opening sentences of the second section, “about me,” bear the same name as Tarrant’s second segment, and deliberately shift the importance away from the individual attacker. This is a pattern that we also noted in previous TVMs and livestreams: TVM from Brenton Tarrant: “Just a ordinary [sic] White man,28 years old. Born in Australia to a working class,low income family. My parents are of Scottish,Irish and English stock. I had a regular childhood, without any great issues.” 51 Although Earnest attempted to live-stream his event, he was unable to get online. For example, Earnest stated in his manifesto: “How long did it take you to plan this attack? Four weeks. Four weeks ago, I decided that I was doing this. Four weeks later I did it. I remember a specific moment in time after Brenton Tarrant’s sacrifice that something just clicked in my mind. ‘If I won’t defend my race, how can I expect others to do the same?’ I immediately got to planning, and I never looked back.”; J. Reid Meloy and Jeffrey W. Pollard, “Lone-Actor Terrorism and Impulsivity,” (Journal of Forensic Sciences, 62, no. 6, October 2017, pp. 1643-1646), https://doi.org/10.1111/1556-4029.13500. 52 13 Undisclosed Q&A from Stephan Balliet: “Who are you? My name’s not important, important is what I'm about to do. Simply call me Antagonist.” Live-stream from Stephan Balliet: “Hi my name is Anon, and I think the holocaust never happened. Feminism is the cause of decline of the West which acts as a scapegoat for mass immigration and the root of all these problems is the Jew.” Current TVM: “My name is not important; I’m sure sooner or later you will learn it. I was born in July of 2003. I am of Slovak origin, with Croatian and Vojvodina Slovak in there as well. My life has been pretty average; it has had its ups and downs, lows and highs, moments of happiness and joy but also sadness and depression.” However, in contrast to other recent manifestos written by far-right terrorists, this document does not include a self-interview in a question-and-answer format.53 Instead, it appears that the author answers some of the interrogatives raised in older manifestos within the text, for example by offering self-prescribed triggers and motivations, and detailing his supposed path of radicalization. The third section of the piece, titled “addressing detractors,” is another resemblance to Tarrant’s segment that is called “Answers to detractors and to those that oppose my beliefs/methods” and quotes the New Zealand shooter’s manifesto directly: “It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates. It’s the birthrates.” Within this chapter, we also identified a second, new element: the writer includes direct citations from previous terroristic writings, along with the title “Saint” in front of the name of the author, the title of the manifesto and page number of the quote or date of attack:54 “Do not suffer under the delusion of an effortless, riskless democratic victory.” ~Saint Tarrant, The Great Replacement” “Tops might unironically be the best option because 1: It shows that attacks on their people can happen in places where they think it won’t 2: It shows that any black can be the victim 3: They are “innocent” in a way that they haven’t directly caused this due to crimes in the past or what not, which will most like increase coverage“ ~Saint Gendron, 13/05/22” “There is nowhere left to run, turn around, face your enemy, make your stand. There is not a single place left where the tendrils of replacement migration have not touched. There is no single place in the West that is even close to reaching 53 54 Ibid. Footnote #42. (Contagion and Copycat…) Annotation: Bold is added. 14 replacement level birthrates, let alone birthrates that indicate a level of vitality and vigour. There is no pleasant meadow in which you can lay down your weary body, rest your head and wait for it all to blow over.” ~Saint Tarrant, The Great Replacement” In a strong demonstration of the contagion and copycat effect, the fourth and fifth segments are presumably copied from Payton Gendron’s TVM, titled “general thoughts and musings” and “preparations and planning.” The main focus of the latter fragment is on mental preparations and target selection in distinctively general terms, and is deprived of any information that relates to the tactical equipment used during the incident—such as weapons and ammunition—which was discussed at length in the majority of previous documents. 55 In contrast to other proclamations, there are also no specific details on what the exact target will be in terms of minority group or location of the event. While a departure for the patterns identified in prior accelerationist TVMs, the ability of attackers to draw upon a rotating cast of ideologically derived targets is a persistent feature of the broader militant accelerationism landscape, due to the dominant influence of neofascist ideologies on the movement today. A third, new element that is introduced in this manifesto is called “recommended reading,” listing Tarrant’s screed, The Turner Diaries and Hunter by William Luther Pierce, The Brigade by Harold Armstead Covington, as well as Militant Accelerationism and The Hard Reset publications authored by the so-called “Terrorgram Collective.” This is the first time that the Terrorgram Collective is directly mentioned in a manifesto, which ties back to the references of the previously mentioned Saints. In the sixth section of the manuscript, the author declares “special thanks” to a number of individuals and groups, amongst them the Terrogram Collective:56 “Terrorgram Collective - You know who you are. Thank you for your incredible writing and art, for your political texts; for your practical guides. Building the future of the White revolution, one publication at a time.” The seventh element, titled “final remarks,” entails comments associated with a realization to take personal action and extreme measures now to accomplish a specific outcome: “But I can’t wait anymore. I must do what has to be done. I must fight back. I must strike against ZOG. If I have to do it alone, then so be it. I am content with fighting alone.” This violent action and time imperative is also called last resort behavior, a proximal warning behavior associated with the Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18). The TRAP-18 is a structured professional judgment instrument for the operational threat assessment 55 For instance, in the manifestos of Anders Breivik, Brenton Tarrant, John Earnest, Patrick Crusius, Stephan Balliet, and Payton Gendron. 56 Annotation: Bold is original. 15 of lone-actor terrorists, developed by Dr. Reid Meloy. 57 Julia Kupper and Reid Meloy noted that the last resort indicator was prevalent in 87% of TVMs they studied, and should be viewed as a flashing red light when it appears in written or verbal communications and prompt a closer investigation into the author.58 The TVM from the Bratislava case indicates that the author was influenced by others who carried out similar attacks; in particular, it is evident that Tarrant and Gendron’s writings served as an inspiration and template for this manifesto, as it references their names, cites textual elements, and copies structural components from previous terroristic communications. It can be anticipated that this document will incite further violence and inspire far-right sympathizers to conduct copycat attacks in the form of lone-actor terrorist incidents with a mass casualty intent. Pre-Attack Twitter Feed The social media platform Twitter played a central role in this incident, which the perpetrator utilized to: 1. Post pre-attack messages that he leaked in the days prior to the event; 2. Publish and disseminate his manifesto on the day of the incident; 3. Communicate with several users post-attack and pre-suicide. Indeed, it appears that this was the first time that an individual associated with the Saints culture utilized this specific approach to publish his manifesto; in previous cases, far-right terrorists disseminated their writings on imageboards (e.g., 4chan and 8chan), messaging apps (e.g., Discord), or personal websites.59 That being said, Twitter has been exploited by jihadists in the past, for instance during the 2013 Westgate shopping mall attack in Kenya when Al Shabab livetweeted the event.60 Within the far-right space, Brenton Tarrant posted pictures of his weapons and other equipment used during his incident in the days leading up to the attack. In the Bratislava case, the Twitter profile was established in April 2021 and prior to the act of violence, tweets were only composed in the English language, with a total of eleven tweets being registered in the first month. The activity then decreased to an average of 0.6 tweets per month between May 2021 and April 2022. We noted a sudden increase of seven posts in May and six in June of 2022, followed by an eruption of 62 tweets in August and the highest number of 115 57 Reid Meloy, “Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol,” Global Institute of Forensic Research (MHS Public Safety, n.d.), https://gifrinc.com/trap-18-manual/. 58 For more details and textual samples of the last resort behavior in TVMs, see: Julia Kupper and J. Reid Meloy, “Trap-18 Indicators Validated through the Forensic Linguistic Analysis of Targeted Violence Manifestos,” (Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 8, no. 4, 2021, pp. 174-199), https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000165. 59 For detailed examples, such as Brenton Tarrant (8chan), Hugo Jackson (Discord), Dylann Roof (personal website), see: Julia Kupper and J. Reid Meloy, “Trap-18 Indicators Validated through the Forensic Linguistic Analysis of Targeted Violence Manifestos,” (Journal of Threat Assessment and Management, 8, no. 4, 2021, pp. 174-199), https://doi.org/10.1037/tam0000165. 60 J.M. Berger, “Hug-a-Mole,” Substack (WORLD GONE WRONG, November 30, 2022), https://jmberger.substack.com/p/hug-a-mole. 16 postings in September 2022 (see Graphics 1, 2, 3). An acceleration in frequency or variety of activities (online or offline) related to an act of terrorism, particularly the final preparations in the months or days leading up to an event, is referred to as “energy burst,” another proximal warning behavior of the previously mentioned Terrorist Radicalization Assessment Protocol (TRAP-18). This digital surge corresponds to a couple of statements in the manifesto, where it is claimed that: “In May of this year, I began writing this document and seriously preparing myself for carrying out a strike against ZOG.” “It [the manifesto] lay dormant for months, until May of this year, when I picked it up and began seriously working on it again.” In August 2022, the assailant posted photos of himself outside certain buildings in Bratislava, which were later found out to have been his intended targets (“Just taking a look at some places…”; tweeted on March 15, 2022).61 This included a block of apartments owned by Slovakia’s prime minister, Eduard Heger, as well as places associated with Jewish faith and culture in the downtown area, and Tepláreň bar, a known “queer” establishment, which ultimately became his target of choice.62 A month later, on September 9, 2022, a tweet proclaimed “Happy Holocaust and Racial Violence Day,” a reference to Slovakia’s Holocaust Victims and Racial Hatred Day. The online feed would narrate the perpetrator’s decision to “fight the enemy” or “the invaders [who…] will not remove themselves.” With “invaders” the author referred to “subhumans,” who were virtually on the cusp of “replacing” whites in places such as Western Europe, North America, and Russia. In October 2022, the month of the attack, the perpetrator’s Twitter activity decreased to thirty tweets. We argue that there appears to be a negative correlation between the online activity and on the ground behavior in the days prior to the act of violence. A day before the attack, and reminiscent of other individuals who carried out far-right terrorist attacks (e.g., Robert Bowers), only one tweet was posted (“I have made my decision”), and on the day of the act of violence, the manifesto and other statements were disseminated, such as “It [presumably the attack] will be done.”63 Thus, we identified an increase in posts in the months prior to his attack, followed by a sharp decrease in the days leading up to the incident. Lastly, this pattern of intensification beginning in June of 2022 supports the assertion in the manifesto that Gendron’s incident in May of 2022 was a significant catalyzing factor in the decision to act upon the author’s hateful views. This pattern of seeing another attacker take action on behalf of a shared in-group or collective identity (in this case “a white European race”), is a key feature of the copycat and contagion effect detailed in the next section. Pravda, “Strelec Sa Fotil Pred Hegerovou Bytovkou. O Svoj Život SA Neobávam, Povedal Premiér,” (Pravda.sk, October 13, 2022), https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/643533-heger-vyzval-nazastavenie-nenavisti-apeluje-na-verejnost-i-politikov/. 62 “Tepláreň (@Teplaren) ,” (Instagram, n.d.), https://www.instagram.com/teplaren/. 63 Matúš Zdút, “Útočníka Zo Zámockej Našli Mŕtveho, K Streľbe Sa Prihlásil Na Twitteri, Pár Hodín Predtým Zverejnil Manifest Proti Židom a LGBTI,” Denník N (Denník N, October 13, 2022), https://dennikn.sk/3052833/k-strelbe-na-zamockej-sa-prihlasil-muz-na-twitteri-par-hodin-predtymzverejnil-manifest-proti-zidom-a-lgbti/?ref=tit. 61 17 Graphic 1. Total number of tweets per month, April 2021 to October 2022 Graphic 2. Total number of tweets per day, April 2021 to October 2022 Graphic 3. Total number of tweets per day, August 2022 to October 2022 18 The Contagion and Copycat Effect in the Twitter Feed The Twitter profile provides further evidence of the contagion and copycat effect of far-right terrorists that inspire and influence future imitators, as notorious role models were referenced in written and visual forms throughout the tweets of the Bratislava perpetrator. The earliest remark was posted on August 3, 2022, and incorporated two photos of Patrick Crusius, who conducted a mass shooting at a Walmart in El Paso, Texas, on that exact date three years prior. Furthermore, a screenshot of a section of Tarrant’s TVM was posted in September 2022 along with a reference to “St. Tarrant”—short for Saint Tarrant—and in a separate tweet, the Christchurch shooter’s manifesto was cited directly. In October 2022, two days before the attack, one of the tweets listed “heroes and role models” and a multitude of positive references were made to “Brenton Tarrant, Payton Gendron, Otoya Yamaguchi, Anders Breivik, Henri Fenet, Ján Režňák, Izidor Kovárik, Robert Jay Mathews, Kiyoshi Ogawa, Robert Bowers, Adolf Eichmann and John T. Earnest.” Furthermore, photos of John Earnest, Brenton Tarrant, Dylann Roof 64 and Anders Breivik were shared, and it was proclaimed that in terms of ideology, the author had “a great appreciation for William Luther Pierce, Harold J. Covington (despite the controversies surrounding him), Brenton Tarrant, and the numerous anons on 8chan and Telegram spreading the truth.” On the morning of the act of violence, a photo of Tarrant with an edited smile was circulated. The numerous mentions of Tarrant correlate with the substantial references to his name in the manifesto and underline the importance and influence of the Christchurch shooter’s act of terror during the radicalization and planning process in this case. It could be argued that the Twitter name, @NTMA0315, is a further reference to Tarrant, who conducted his attack on March 15, 2019 (03/15). The Bratislava shooter has since been praised as “Saint Tarrant’s 6 th Disciple” in accelerationist spaces, according to a threat assessment report by Moonlight. Suicide Note Contrary to the TVM that was authored in English, the suicide note that was discovered at Krajčík’s parental home was handwritten in the perpetrator’s native tongue, the Slovak language.65 This might be due to the personal nature of the document, as suicide letters are typically not intended to be spread to a wider audience and are compiled with a specific addressee in mind. In this case, the letter was organized into different sections and addressed to “My family,” “Mother, father,” “Little Nathalie” (Krajčík’s sister) and “Her” (an unknown crush that the writer “never had the courage to tell”). These segments are more intimate than the content of the TVM and express gratitude towards Krajčík’s family and regret for “not always having been a good son.” Other sections of the note are greatly focused on killing others, with a supposed hero figure fighting an oppressive system while offering self-prescribed explanations and justifications for a targeted act of violence against the author’s enemies. The writer displays an intense warrior mentality and appears to be deeply absorbed into his set of beliefs that he can “save his race,” a strong moral reasoning that follows a path that is logical to him: 64 Dylann Roof committed a terrorist attack at a church in Charleston, SC, in June 2015, killing 9 and injuring 1. 65 One of the authors of this report is fluent in Slovak and translated the suicide note into English. 19 “I walk out, out through the door of my house and I will attack the enemy with everything that I’ve got. With all my power. I’ll do that with a smile on my face and fully recognize that this will mean a lot for the rest of my life.” In general, a suicide letter is a product of a person who has decided to end his or her life and usually expresses an intent of lethal self-injury; this is often paired with methods and motives for the act of self-destruction, for instance psychological or physical pain, hopelessness, emptiness, guilt or shame.66 However, the suicide note in the Bratislava case is not particularly concerned with killing oneself—in fact, there is no explicit reference to an alleged act of self-destruction, though there is one remark about death: “Even after death, I will still be with you but not in person. Memories, experiences, they will remain forever.” The sentence “19 years of life might sound as if it was a short life but this is fine” vaguely reflects suicidal thoughts but is ego-syntonic, i.e., an idea that is acceptable to the self and compatible with the writer’s values and thinking. 67 Thus, it might be argued that the message was written in case the author perished during his planned attack, albeit not from a self-inflicted injury. Moreover, it needs to be noted that other far-right terrorists that conducted similar incidents typically do not author suicide notes, in all probability because they are not suicidal at the time of the attack. This is unlike offenders that are predominantly driven by personal grievances, such as school or workplace shooters, who often incorporate self-induced annihilation or suicide-by-cop when planning their events. Additionally, this might be attributable to the fact that in contrast to violent jihadism-inspired attacks, far-right terrorists do not have to commit suicide in order to become a martyr or hero for their movement—being incarcerated is sufficient.68 To a certain degree, the suicide note’s content bears some resemblance to the final section of the TVM labeled “final remarks,” such as the following examples that demonstrate lexical overlap between both texts (i.e., similar or identical expressions): Manifesto: “I am doing this for all of you - family, friends, acquaintances, loved ones. But most of all, I am doing this for my People - my Race.” Suicide note: “I’m doing this for my people, I’m doing this for my nation, I’m doing this for my race. I’m doing this for you, for [name of girl], her children and for their children.” For more information, see Amendra Shrestha et al., “Words of Suicide: Identifying Suicidal Risk in Written Communications,” (2021 IEEE International Conference on Big Data, December 2021), https://doi.org/10.1109/bigdata52589.2021.9671472. 67 Private conversation with Dr. Tahir Rahman, November 2022. 68 Ibid. Footnote #36 - (Am & Weimann). 66 20 Manifesto: “I must do what has to be done. I must fight back. I must strike against ZOG. If I have to do it alone, then so be it. I am content with fighting alone.” Suicide note: “I have chosen the way of fighting against the Jewish enemies and their collaborators. My mind is at ease with this decision, I don’t have any regrets.” Manifesto: “And if I am to be the last person to ever fight for my Race, then so be it. I am content with being the last one. But I know I’m not the last one.” Suicide note: “It is time to go in front and fight, even if I was to be the last European to do so. But I know I won't be the last.” Furthermore, the phrase “We won't see each other on earth but I will be waiting for you on the other side” is similar to the very last tweet that was posted on October 12, 2022, which was also written in Slovak and can be translated to: “Bye see you on the other side”. These quotes appear to indicate an intense emotional commitment to attack, which is relished, amplified, and defended by the author throughout the text. This type of binary, simplistic, and absolute thinking is a cognitive-affective fixation driver, also called an Extreme Overvalued Belief, a concept that has been pioneered by Drs. Tahir Rahman and Reid Meloy. 69 The suicide note also appears to highlight that the perpetrator claims in-group membership to a force that brings their digital frustration into a real-world environment by committing targeted violence attacks. This social function had previously been detected by Kupper et al. (2022)70 within the manifestos of far-right terrorists that carried out or intended to execute mass casualty events across the globe. In this case, the content of the suicide note is not focused on the individual itself or the act of committing suicide but appears to be a cultural code to signal belonging to the international far-right community. Post-Attack Twitter Feed Approximately six hours after publishing the manifesto on Twitter and two hours after the attack and while being on the run, it appears that Krajčík began posting on social media platforms and engaged in conversations with other users in English and Slovak. During this time, the manifesto was reposted and numerous English hashtags were used in these messages and posts, including: #bratislava #hatecrime #gaybar #zamocka #teplaren. This was likely done to receive more traction to the profile, though it was also stated in Slovak that “this is not about fame, that’s why I J. Reid Meloy and Tahir Rahman, “Cognitive‐Affective Drivers of Fixation in Threat Assessment,” (Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 39, no. 2, October 19, 2020, pp. 170-189), https://doi.org/10.1002/bsl.2486. 70 Ibid. Footnote #42 - (Contagion and Copycat…) 69 21 didn’t even put my name anywhere.” Despite that assertion, Terrorgram channels quickly took up the attack as an act derived from their community and claimed the attacker as their own.71 Furthermore, the perpetrator attempted to explain his actions on the platform, writing in Slovak: “I have killed 2 faggots, this will do. If all who had my views were to do the same, then the problem would be over in one day.” He also expressed no regrets over his actions in English (“#bratislava feeling no regrets, isn’t that funny?”) and asked for some last words from the audience in Slovak (“well, tough guys, give me your last words”). Additionally, he indicated that his followers would be “see[ing] him on the other side” in Slovak and posted an emoji of a hand waving goodbye. 72 4Chan Interactions Four hours after the attack, at 11:00 p.m. on October 12, 2022, and whilst being at large, Krajčík appears to have been active as “Anonymous ID:N/84kh31” in a 4chan thread in an attempt to explain his motives for the act of violence and potentially to receive notoriety. Eighteen of his remarks were expressed in English and one response to a Slovakian comment was written in the perpetrator’s mother tongue. During the exchanges in which he participated for almost half an hour, the shooter also attempted to authenticate himself to his audience: at the request of several imageboard users, Krajčík included three selfies of his face and upper body, including one with his shoe on his head. It can be assumed that he typed these messages on his phone, as he is depicted outside in a forest in all of the photos and was on the run when posting. The comments from other 4chan users predominantly focused on Krajčík’s radicalization, the attack, and its implications. Whilst interacting with other participants of the channel, the author was verbally abused and bullied and received little sympathy for his actions, for example: “2 dead, 1 injured, shooter on the run. His twitter is filled with shizo shit and 65 page manifesto about jews.” “Dude what the fuck... You killed two fags in a bar...They'll be on the news for a day. One Google search and you could have found a hundred better targets in your shithole. What do you have to say for yourself?” “You're literally a dead man walking and the price of your hanging was 2 gays... What the fuck. You better be a fucking larp [live action role playing].” Lukáš Diko et al., “Bratislava Terrorist Radicalized on Terrorgram, Its Members Take Credit,” VSQUARE.ORG (VSquare / Aktuality SK, November 9, 2022), https://vsquare.org/bratislava-terroristradicalized-on-terrorgram-its-members-take-credit/. 72 We noted that none of the post-incident tweets written in Slovak used diacritics, such as á é í č ď ľ, which are considered separate letters and typically used by everyone in Slovakia. While an interesting observation, we do not have strong indications as to why these are lacking. Additionally, the authors possess an archive and screengrabs from the shooter’s Twitter account, which are not available on standard internet archive sources but can be viewed upon request for research purposes. 71 22 In response, Krajčík wrote “wish I could have gone higher but whatever. wanted to bag the prime minister but i didnt get lucky with his car arriving.” This statement would explain the numerous references he made on his Twitter feed to the head of state pre-incident, such as “#eduardheger #ntma0315 test and preparation” on August 14, 2022. 73 The perpetrator also wrote that he could have attacked Jewish targets in close proximity, that it was his decision to conduct the attack, and expressed regret as he ran out of ammunition and was unable to carry out more attacks. This partly explains his post-attack actions related to exchanging weapons at home, stating that he felt “sad for my family, happy with my own life, nothing for the two faggots. soon a bit of lead [himself].” Some users appeared to be particularly concerned with his path of radicalization and repeatedly inquired if he was groomed by individuals on various platforms, such as Telegram: User: “have you been talking to some other people over telegram/discord/signal?” Krajčík: “made my own decision to do this, i had barely any dms with people on telegram or wherever.” User: “In this tweet here >>399538708 you clearly stated that you have great appreciation for numerous anons on Telegram . But in >>399542933 you said "barely" > i had barely any dms with people on telegram or wherever. So which one is it? Are you trying to protect your anon friends?” Krajčík: “theyre channel owners, hence the anon part. dont know their names, they produce good content though” User: “so please Were you groomed on discord or something? Please be honest. Did someone help you plan this? Was it all your idea? Waiting patiently. Godspeed anon.” Krajčík: “not groomed. got my views first from 8c then various sites. most of all seeing it with my own eyes really settled the deal for me. decided on my own volition” Given the clear bi-directional relationship between Krajčík and Terrorgram, his deflection of the questions asked by those he interacted with post-attack on 4chan and Twitter raise additional 73 NTMA0315 was Krajčík’s Twitter username. 23 questions about the nature of his relationship to Terrorgram and the channels that heavily promoted his incident in the short timeframe after it occurred. Specifically, his slippage that he had “dms” with Telegram-based individuals who are “channel owners” that “produce good content” narrows down the attribution to which individuals he may reasonably be referring to within Terrorgram. Lacking more direct evidence and an ability to interview the subject, we can only speculate as to the communities he may have been referring to in those messages. We also identified shared language between the suicide note and one of the post-incident 4chan comments, similarly to the textual overlap between the suicide letter and manifesto: Suicide note: “I’d prefer to ‘only’ live 19 years than to live 99 years under occupation and with the understanding of what is happening and what is happening to us.” 4chan comment: “my nigger i’d rather live just 19 years than 91 while knowing what the kikes are doing.” Forensic Authorship Analysis This section presents a summary of conclusions that were drawn from the language evidence of the Bratislava case; a full methodological explanation is beyond the purview of this report.74 As such, we only highlight a selection of characteristics to illustrate the patterns of the overall findings that were noted across the manifesto, tweets, suicide note and 4chan comments, as this report is meant to be a timely assessment on an act of violence for law enforcement, threat assessment teams, and researchers in the terrorism space. On the basis of linguistic patterns that were identified in the different sets of language evidence, we suggest that Juraj Krajčík did not author the manifesto and certain tweets in their entirety but that a second, unknown author assisted him in writing some of the texts and/or provided language. Specifically due to the inconsistencies in writing styles between and across the different text types authored in English, we propose that some sections of the manifesto and certain tweets appear to be more consistent with the author profile of a native speaker of English, who is possibly older, well-educated, and from the United States, rather than a 19-year-old native Slovak speaker who never resided outside of his home country. Additionally, we propose that the offender authored all of the 4chan comments in his own words. Lexis: The Hidden Author The results of the stylistic and error analyses that were applied to the language evidence of the Bratislava case prompted us to explore the possibility of dual authorship. As such, the manifesto and a variety of tweets were written in an unusually formal register with high-level vocabulary but simultaneously displayed a wide range of informal, derogative lexis with American-centric terms. 74 The findings are preliminary and will be built on in a forthcoming in-depth study that will provide further explanations regarding the forensic linguistic methodologies that were used to analyze the pre- and postincident corroborations (i.e., forensic authorship analysis and linguistic author profiling). 24 Of particular interest were also the use of North American-focused idioms, which are metaphorical and culture-specific.75 Indeed, many sections of the manifesto and some of the tweets indicated a deep fixation on U.S.-American social and political contexts but lacked comparable geographical and linguistic references to Europe or local remarks about Slovakia, the perpetrator’s home country. This is remarkable because militant accelerationism narratives are designed and targeted to challenge Europe’s sovereignty and identity, and have been a crucial mobilization component for extreme acts of violence. Furthermore, this high level of formality had not been detected in previous manifestos authored by English native speakers that committed similar terrorism attacks.76 With the help of the Global Web-based English corpus,77 we tested a variety of vocabulary, which confirmed that selected words and phrases are predominantly used in the United States’ variation of English. In contrast, the lexical choices within the 4chan responses were not as complex, creative, or American-focused as in the manifesto or certain tweets: there was a minimal amount of formal words and a limited range of derogatory terms, as well as a lack of idioms. These features could be related to the text type and length of the overall comments or indicate inter-author variation.78 Although we did not conduct a forensic authorship analysis across the Slovak and English linguistic evidence, as they are typologically different languages, we believe it is important to highlight that the suicide note, handwritten in the perpetrator’s mother tongue, was authored in plainer and simpler language than the English manifesto and certain tweets. The rudimentary vocabulary, uncomplicated grammar, and many clipped sentences were somewhat unexpected, as we would have anticipated a similarly strong command of the Slovak language from the perpetrator. However, these variances might be attributed to different register factors, such as text type, tenor, and mode. In summary, though it is plausible that Krajčík was exposed to American English through movies, TV shows, books, and other means—and likely conducted vast amounts of digital research on American English websites and radicalized in militant accelerationism online spaces on Telegram and “the Chans”—we propose that these linguistic characteristics most likely suggest the interference of a second, unknown author, who is a well-educated English native speaker that possibly originates from the United States. Furthermore, the word “internet” was spelled in uppercase on numerous occasions in the manifesto and once on Twitter, which is an outdated spelling version, unless the author wanted to add a particular emphasis to the word. In combination with rather old-fashioned North American idioms such as “hook, line and sinker” that are less consistent with the language use of a young, native Slovak speaker, we propose that these could be indications for the hidden author being of older age than the perpetrator, possibly between 45 to 55 years old. Krzysztof Kredens, Ria Perkins, and Tim Grant, “Developing a Framework for the Explanation of Interlingual Features for Native and Other Language Influence Detection,” (Language and Law / Linguagem e Direito, 6, no. 2, December 31, 2019, pp. 10-23), https://doi.org/10.21747/21833745/lanlaw/6_2a2. 76 For example: Brenton Tarrant, Patrick Crusius, Payton Gendron. 77 Mark Davies, “Corpus of Global Web-Based English: 1.9 billion words from speakers in 20 countries (GloWbE), ” https://corpus.byu.edu/glowbe/. 78 Inter-author variation refers to writing differences between two authors. 75 25 Orthography: Textual Variations The comparison of orthographic features—such as spelling, capitalization, and punctuation— across the different text types yielded significant discrepancies that might not be explained in the range of within-author variation but are more likely attributed to inter-author distinctiveness.79 Despite the fact that the manifesto and tweets were written in American English spelling throughout, we identified a disparity in the date formats and punctuation use related to quotation marks. As such, while the manifesto and tweets use the American date format (month-day-year), a notation that is extremely uncommon in Europe or any other continents besides North America, a handwritten note uploaded with one of the 4chan comments included the European style (daymonth-year). Additionally, the tweets displayed variation in the use of quotation marks, switching between British and American English usage: in British English and many other European languages, commas and full stops are placed outside quotation marks, whereas American English positions them within. This is in contrast to the manifesto, which follows British English punctuation rules only; the 4chan comments did not include any quotes. We believe it is extremely unlikely that a native Slovak speaker that never lived outside of his home country would use both the European and American date format and punctuation rules associated with quotation marks. Thus, we suggest that these features indicate that it is more likely that there were two authors involved in the creation of certain textual elements in the manifesto and on Twitter. It is particularly interesting that the American English punctuation format began being used in some of the tweets from May 2022 onwards, the same month the White Terror Production ended its content collection for their video, and Payton Gendron conducted his terrorism attack in Buffalo, NY, the latter event having been cited as a “turning point” in the manifesto. Furthermore, it appears to coincide with statements in the manifesto that the writing of the pamphlet was continued after many months of idleness and the start of serious preparations for the Bratislava attack. It also seems to correspond to the sudden increase in the Twitter profile activity, which prior to May 2022 evidenced infrequent, short posts, which then shifted to more formal, lengthier postings with American-centric content. Mistakes: Writing Competence and Errors When conducting comparative authorship analyses across different text types, it is crucial to consider genre and register factors because they can affect an individual’s writing style and result in a significant amount of within-author-variation. We carefully considered and evaluated this for the following findings between the varying text types and suggest that the writing competence of the manifesto and certain tweets is higher with less spelling, grammatical, and syntactical errors, whereas other tweets and the 4chan comments display a lower writing competence with more spelling, grammatical, and syntactical errors. The variation in spelling mistakes could be ascribed to the different genres, as tweets and 4chan comments are not coherent texts—in comparison to a manifesto—but rather smaller entities of language that might not be as readily corrected, due to the varying, more dynamic, and informal nature of these types of communications. Nevertheless, the manifesto consisted of a relatively small number of grammatical and syntactical mistakes, which is contrary to proclamations authored by other non-native speakers of English 79 Within-author variation refers to internal writing differences of one author, whereas inter-author variation means writing differences between two authors. 26 that conducted similar offenses.80 However, the marked (unusual), non-standard forms that were detected in the screed are more consistent with a person who speaks English as a second language: non-agreements between nouns and verbs, lack of or incorrect use of determiners, fused words, and superfluous punctuation. Slovak and many other languages do not have determiners but strict and complex comma rules, which might explain why the offender experienced difficulties with these attributes and carried them over into English. These kinds of mistakes are not unusual for a non-native speaker that never resided in an English-speaking country, even if this individual went to a private school where English was one of the key subjects. The aforementioned types of grammatical mistakes were also identified across some of the tweets, in addition to prepositional and of-genitive errors. Particularly the latter feature is in contrast to the perfect use of the singular and plural genitive case throughout the manifesto, which could be a sign of inter-author variation and dual authorship. Furthermore, out of the eighteen 4chan comments written in English, eight contained grammatical and syntactical mistakes. One explanation for this could be a potential adrenaline rush the perpetrator experienced after the attack, which might have influenced his English language skills. This was also noticed in Stephan Balliet’s live-stream during his act of terror in Halle, Germany, in which he switched between his native tongue German and his second language English. 81 Other explanations for this higher number of errors could be ascribed to the text type or inter-author differences between the manifestos, tweets and 4chan comments, or could be a sign of dual authorship. The Accelerationism Influence Juraj Krajčík’s attack is the most clear-cut example of an accelerationist attacker since Brenton Tarrant. No other mass shooter or far-right terrorist has so openly and granularly discussed the merits of accelerationist tactics and violence. Even Tarrant, the preeminent exemplar of a militant accelerationist terrorist, spent fewer words on the topic than Krajčík. Based on our review of Krajčík’s TVM and social media activity, it is undeniable that Krajčík explicitly conducted his attack based on his embrace of militant accelerationism. For example, on September 16, 2022, Krajčík posted a Twitter thread that laid out an intimate understanding and endorsement of militant accelerationism as a tactic and strategy towards societal collapse. Such sophisticated discussion of strategic reasons for militant accelerationism is uncommon in the discourse of a typical individual in an accelerationist Telegram chat or forum. Below is the quoted Twitter thread: 80 For example: Sebastian Bosse, Stephan Balliet, Hugo Jackson Julia Kupper is leading a study, co-authored by an interdisciplinary team of Forensic Linguists and Psychologists, that researches this phenomenon–also called bilingual code-switching–in Stephan Balliet’s language evidence associated with his terrorism attack. At the time of this report, the study is still being written and will be published in 2023/2024. 81 27 “The most common criticism of accelerationism I see is “heh, your solution is just waiting for things to get worse? well things are getting worse and nothing changes. accelerationist cucks owned!” The validity of this criticism really depends on the person. For some, accelerationism really IS just sittint [sic] around and waiting. It is no different to the people who pray or vote - the solution is always just 2 weeks away! In its essence, accelerationism boils down to “things have to get worse before they get better”. But, as the name accelerationism itself suggests, the main and pivotal thing, is that things have to get worse QUICKLY. They have to get worse faster. It’s the boiling frog analogy. If things get worse slowly, the lemmings/normies will slowly adapt to it, and they won’t get uncomfortable until it is too late. If things get worse quickly, the lemmings/normies will take notice and get uncomfortable. The know this, which is why they make sure to up the ante slowly, over the course of decades even. That way, the goyim never rebel. They have no reason to change. Outside of black swan events (Covid, George Floyd riots) this modus operandi of their is unchanged. What does that mean? It is up to US to accelerate. To boil the frog faster. Accelerationism means HELPING the System collapse FASTER. From vandalizing gook businesses with BLM slogans, to breaking windows, to acts of [REDACTED], every act that helps the decline of the System, that costs it money and manpower, THAT is accelerationism. Not sitting around and waiting.” Three passages of Krajčík’s TVM specifically speak to the extent to which he adhered to accelerationism as a tactical approach and how he saw himself contributing towards the instigation of a societal collapse. The first is a definition of accelerationism from Krajčík in the Twitter thread mentioned above: “Accelerationism means HELPING the System collapse FASTER.” The second is a passage 82 from his TVM, which illustrates the centrality of antisemitism to militant accelerationism: “Accelerate the decline of ZOG, so that we may rise from its ruins.” The third is found in the Krajčík’s “Recommended reading” section, wherein Krajčík discusses Tarrant’s TVM, The Great Replacement, and Tarrant’s role in the “modern accelerationist resistance”: 82 Annotation: Bold is original. 28 “Saint Brenton Tarrant is the man who started the modern accelerationist resistance, with his act of propaganda of the deed that inspired numerous men across the world, from places as disparate as United States and Germany to Singapore, to stand up and strike out against their enemies.” Additionally, another indication of Krajčík’s deeper knowledge of militant accelerationism is his utilization of a militancy framework described in his TVM section, which is titled “The triune resistance” and accompanied by the graphic in Image 1. While oriented towards a “white resistance to ZOG (Zionist Occupied Government),” the inclusion of this graphic demonstrates a sophisticated understanding of conceptual frameworks for militant accelerationism as a strategic approach to direct action for both individuals and the broader movement. Interestingly, in his discussion of militant accelerationism as an appropriate tactic to resolving the grievances he holds, Krajčík recognizes that which terrorism scholars have long established, that most individuals who hold radical or extreme views do not engage in more aggressive actions or terrorism. In his TVM he states that: “While progressing up the stem, most people still believe in a political or diplomatic solution to our problems, and thus believe that the solution is to simply make as many people as possible enter the stem and climb up it.” Krajčík maturely recognizes that once individuals reach a certain point in their radicalization (or “awakening”, as he referred to the lower part of the main stem in Image 1), they are faced with multiple options on how to further entrench themselves and engage with the struggle: 1) joining the movement; 2) passive resistance; and 3) active resistance. His description of these three components of the triune, or three-pronged approach to accelerationism, varies slightly from other forms of the framework evaluated by the authors, but his recognition of the core concepts illustrates his understanding of the high-level strategy of militant accelerationism. In doing so, he displays a profoundly advanced grasp of the place he holds in the broader militant accelerationism ecosystem, especially given his age and relative isolation from the core leadership of Terrorgram. 29 What is especially of note is his awareness of the middle prong as a “shield” or distraction to the “System” so that the other two prongs can carry out their mission without being impeded. Two passages demonstrate this well: “The people who, either consciously or just for a lack of a better option, join one of the many public-facing, open-registration groups operating at any given moment.” And “Yet they are crucially important, because they make the System focus on a red herring, giving the covert passive and active resistance more breathing room. They allow the shooters and bombers to operate, to hide among other people instead of standing out in the open. They are like a shield, absorbing the blows of the enraged, wounded beast, while the other two prongs flank the beast and deliver crushing blows to its sides.” In these passages, we can understand Krajčík’s description of the middle prong to be a reference to the skullmask network and other neofascist entities like the Active Clubs, Patriot Front, Proud Boys, and more that have clear accelerationist factions within their ranks. Additionally, while it is convenient to interpret this reference as a function of a long-standing debate over “movementarianism” within far-right neofascist milieus, it would be errant. Rinaldo Nazzaro (aka Roman Spear), founder of The Base, and other leaders of the various branded factions of the skullmask network have long discussed the skullmask network, as the tip of the spear. They have also spoken to its presence as a shield against the System, which Alex Newhouse has aptly identified as a recurring and intentional pattern of “continual collapse, reshuffling, and reemergence of groups over time.”83 Notably, at the top of the middle prong is an illustration of a shield that is reminiscent of the division shields style that define most skullmask groups, particularly when used in conjunction with the Sonnenrad, or black sun, symbol (see Image 1). Below is an image generated by the Iron March forum (see Image 2), which was created specifically to facilitate the emergence of skullmask brands like Atomwaffen Division, that illustrates the aesthetic centrality of division shields for prominent neofascist accelerationist skullmask networks. Newhouse, “The Threat Is the Network: The Multi-Node Structure of Neo-Fascist Accelerationism,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point (USMA Westpoint, January 7, 2022), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-threat-is-the-network-the-multi-node-structure-of-neo-fascistaccelerationism/. 83Alex 30 Ultimately, Krajčík’s grappling with the trident construct for militant accelerationism demonstrates that while he was clearly an avid consumer of militant accelerationism content, he was also an innovator through his advancement of militant accelerationism’s corpus of TVMs. His advanced knowledge of accelerationism as a grand strategy against the alleged conspiratorial enemy (i.e., the Jewish people) manifested in a more nuanced manner via his TVM. This contrasts starkly with Gendron’s simplistic repetition and recycling of Tarrant’s manifesto section titled “Accelerationism,” to which Gendron made only minor alterations to Tarrant’s content, saying that “he couldn’t express his own views better than Tarrant could.”84 Our analysis of Krajčík’s TVM and social media activity reveals that, like Gendron, Krajčík is a product of “digital militant accelerationism ecosystems” and “appears to be a consumer of accelerationist content and ultimately a product of the violent mobilization concepts that pervade its digital communities.”85 However, Krajčík’s consumption is far deeper than Gendron’s was at the time of the Buffalo attack. Both Gendron and Krajčík espoused similar notions (principally the belief in a grand Jewish conspiracy to control the world and eradicate white culture), but Gendron clearly lacked the depth and substance in understanding the tactical benefits of accelerationism towards resolving those shared grievances that Krajčík put forth. Gendron relied on superficial understandings of accelerationism derived from replicating Tarrant’s manifesto, as well as his aesthetic and crude racism and hate-based conspiracy theories in lieu of deeply held ideological beliefs. These factors leave Gendron purely in a consumer categorization that, while still deadly, limits his overall impact on the future of the Saints Culture they both sought to perpetuate. It is likely that Krajčík’s greatest impact on militant accelerationism ecosystems and adherents going forward will be the addition of his TVM, specifically the discussion of the three-prong approach. Additionally, the positive reception to Krajčík’s TVM by accelerationists in multiple key Terrorgram channels suggests that the tactic is not going away anytime soon as a strategic and tactical goal of militant accelerationism. 84 85 Ibid. Footnote 41 - (The Buffalo Terrorist Attack) Ibid. 31 Mobilizing Concepts Krajčík utilizes multiple narratives and mobilizing concepts 86 that are staples of militant accelerationism. The first mobilizing concept is an extreme antisemitism and fixation on the ZOG, or Zionist Occupied Government. In the TVM section titled “ACCELERATE,” Krajčík explicitly ties his understanding of accelerationism to the ZOG, illustrating that at its core, militant accelerationism is rooted in the conspiracy theory that a secret Jewish conspiracy exists to control the governments of the United States and other Western states and that it must be confronted violently: “Accelerate the decline of ZOG, so that we may rise from its ruins. We must accelerate, for our time is limited. The longer we wait, the more entrenched ZOG gets, the weaker we get, and the harder it will be to uproot them. We must speed up the death and decay of ZOG - for the sooner it falls apart, the easier it will be for us to replace it.” It is here that we see the influence of the Great Replacement conspiracy theory that is so pervasive within far-right attackers' mobilizations, especially within Tarrant who acted as a catalyst to Krajčík’s radicalization to violence. The second mobilizing concept and narrative that he speaks to throughout his TVM is the notion of no political solution: “Wherever you go, spread the news that voting does not matter and that there is no political solution.”87 Building on the first mobilizing concept’s antisemitic ideological foundation, Krajčík expresses that people must strive harder to overcome the ZOG-designed “pressure release valves,” which prevent people from resisting against it. This is a common ideological refrain within neofascist milieus, but is critically important to neofascists that embrace militant accelerationism. In addressing how this can be overcome, Krajčík again invokes the “no political solution” narrative as a mobilizing concept, stating that “frustrated White men'' can “arrive at the conclusion that there is no political solution, and be in a position to do something about it [emphasis original].” The third mobilizing concept and narrative Krajčík speaks to is the notion of resisting the System, citing George Lincoln Rockwell, William Luther Pierce, and James Mason. The System is a common ideological feature of those three individuals and illustrates his embrace of the tenets of Siege Culture, even though he does not explicitly call out Siege as an inspiration. This is consistent with recent Terrorgram publications that retained the markers and components of Cynthia Miller-Idriss, and Brian Hughes, “Blurry Ideologies and Strange Coalitions: The Evolving Landscape of Domestic Extremism,” Lawfare (December 19, 2021), https://www.lawfareblog.com/ blurry-ideologies-and-strange-coalitions-evolving-landscape-domestic-extremism. 86 87 Matthew Kriner, Meghan Conroy, and Yasmine Ashwal, “Understanding Accelerationist Narratives: 'There Is No Political Solution',” ARC (Accelerationism Research Consortium, May 13, 2022), https://www.accresearch.org/shortanalysis/understanding-accelerationist-narratives-there-is-no-politicalsolution. Annotation: Bold is original. 32 Siege Culture without explicitly citing Siege. His utilization of the System indicates a potential underlying ideological outlook, despite his rejection of holding to any specific ideology and having tried out multiples in his past: “As for my ideology, it’s hard to say. Shitposting and trolling are my favorites, but perhaps removing traitors will surpass that. The most accurate description of my ideology would probably be racial nationalism, exclusively focused on the White/European race.” What makes Krajčík’s invocation of these specific mobilizing concepts of particular interest is the extent to which his justification and support for their relevance is predominantly representative of an American perspective. It is notable that he cites Rockwell, Pierce, and Mason, who, while ideological titans for much of the neofascist accelerationism ecosystem, are not common influences in European spaces. This influence is likely due to two factors: first, his heavy consumption of neofascist content from specific Telegram channels and communities that are American-operated. And the second is that these figures’ inclusion within the ideological element of A call to arms provides additional support to the evidence of a second author, one that is likely of American nationality. It is important that we as researchers acknowledge that American actors and networks play a critical role in exporting these violent, pernicious accelerationist frameworks abroad. The next section will examine the role of Telegram’s Terrorgram ecosystem and Krajčík’s association with the digital community. The Role of Terrorgram What makes Krajčík distinct from the vast majority of other far-right mass shooters are the multiple direct appeals to the Terrorgram Collective within his TVM. Krajčík is also claimed by some elements of Terrorgram to be “Terrorgram’s first saint.” To date, this is the first reference to the Terrogram Collective, or the Terrorgram community more broadly, by a far-right mass shooter in a TVM. The implications of this bi-directional dynamic, in combination with the forensic linguistic findings on A call to arms, would suggest that the second author could be associated with the Terrorgram community. Given the long history of Terrorgram inciting mass shooter violence, glorification, and dissemination of TVMs, and serving as the mechanism by which a new Saint is named, it is a logical conclusion. However, to fully understand why this explicit reference to Terrorgram is unique and important, we must first understand what Terrorgram is, and is not. Matthew Kriner and Bjørn Ihler have written in GNET that Terrorgram is best conceptualized as “a loosely connected network of Telegram channels and accounts that adhere to and promote militant accelerationism.” 88 Additionally, they describe Terrorgram channels as “typically neofascist in ideological orientation” and which “regularly share instructions and manuals on how to carry out acts of racially-motivated violence and anti-government, anti-authority terrorism.” However, Terrorgram is not a structured 88 Ibid. Footnote #45 - (Analysing Terrorgram Publications…) 33 space, as it often lacks hard links between its constituent members and factions (e.g., Telegram channels are not hierarchically structured towards a central authority) and it does not generally engage with individual members of associated Telegram channels in a classic command-andcontrol manner. Instead, it serves as a low barrier to entry space for in-group formation, radicalization, dissemination of tactical and ideological materials, and more. Tactically, the space has been used to coordinate harassment against opponents, swatting campaigns, and other harmful activities. In the context of mobilization to violence, much of the Terrorgram community’s content is oriented towards instigating individual acts through stochastic methods, such as promotion of narratives and conspiracy theories, which serve as mobilizing concepts for specific audiences. Thus, militant accelerationism is often strategically framed as a means of identifying suitable targets and individuals and as a tactical solution towards resolving specific ideologically derived grievances towards those same targets. As such, a significant function of Terrorgram and its promotion of militant accelerationism is the lionization of Saints and the cultivation of the corresponding Saints Culture. According to Graham Macklin, Terrorgram and the broader ecosystem that it belongs to is “a ‘dark fandom’ that venerates and valorizes extreme-right terrorists as ‘saints’ and ‘martyrs’ in a manner similar to the heroization of school shooters and serial killers.”89 Per Krajčík’s social media activity and TVM, he was not only keenly aware of this community and its purpose but sought to be seen as one of the Saints that define the preeminent social status one could attain within that digital ecosystem. In the recommended reading section of the TVM, Krajčík refers to two publications: Militant Accelerationism and The Hard Reset. Krajčík explains that these two texts provide “practical” means to resisting the supposed ZOG. The second reference comes in the section titled “Special thanks,” a mixture of misdirection and direct thanks to influential figures on Krajčík’s radicalization. There he addresses the Terrorgram Collective directly, saying: “You know who you are. Thank you for your incredible writing and art, for your political texts; for your practical guides. Building the future of the White revolution, one publication at a time.” Johannes Dafinger and Moritz Florin, “A Transnational History of Right-Wing Terrorism: Political Violence and the Far Right in Eastern and Western Europe since 1900”, (London: Routledge, 2022), https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003105251-16/praise-saints-graham-macklin. 89 34 And the final passage of his TVM, which reads “When your time comes, make it count. Make it count!” is a direct reference to the Make It Count pamphlet that was distributed in June of 2022 by the Terrorgram Collective. The Terrorgram reception to Krajčík’s attack was surprisingly rapid in comparison to other attackers, such as Gendron. Additionally, Krajčík experienced little audience resistance to inclusion into the pantheon of Saints, despite his self-described low “kill count.” Key channels related to the promotion and dissemination of the Terrorgram publications that Krajčík had cited in his TVM, especially the channels that disseminated and promoted the White Terror video—a Terrorgram Collective publication—highly praised Krajčík’s attack. For example, the Terrorgram Collective released an image and post honoring the Bratislava shooter on the release day of White Terror. According to the channel administrators likely responsible for the curation of the White Terror video, the video was already complete by the time the Bratislava attack had occurred. “This documentary is dedicated to Saint Juraj Krajčík, whose attack and ultimate sacrifice fell just days before White Terror’s slated release.” However, they made clear that Krajčík’s attack had met the criteria of inclusion to the “Saints list” in their estimation and discussed their intent to include Juraj Krajčík as a Saint moving forward. A Grim Postscript and Conclusion Remarkably, Krajčík’s father decided to conduct a post-attack interview, his only media appearance since the incident, with Marian Kotleba, the leader of rival Slovakian far-right political party L’SNS (People’s Party Our Slovakia). 90 The interview between a clearly distressed Krajčík Senior and Kotleba offers a fascinating glance into the world of the local far-right, which is only seemingly divided by personal animosities or historical issues.91 However, the following key points were apparent in the interview: 1. Both figures perceive the shooter as a “victim” and “not guilty” of the murders on October 12, 2022; 2. Krajčík’s father appeared convinced that his son must have been manipulated into doing this or was simply framed as a decoy for somebody else’s real actions; 3. Kotleba, on the other hand, conspiratorially stresses that photos he saw of Juraj Krajčík convinced him that the death was not a suicide and that the shooter was shot by a third party; Ibid. Footnote #4. - (Interview with attacker’s father) Both Kotleba’s party and Vlasť attempted to form a joint party list before the 2020 elections. The leader of L’SNS–fearful of Harabin’s popularity which saw him win 14% of the vote in the 2019 presidential election–even appealed to Harabin directly “to forget personal arguments” and put forward one party list. Ultimately, it did not come to this, as the two differ on a string of issues, not to mention their approach towards the Slovak National Uprising (SNS) of 1944 with Vlasť proudly positioning itself as proponents of the then-rebel forces and the arriving Red Army and Kotleba’s L’SNS in favor of the 1939-45 Slovak State, a Nazi German satellite statelet against which the uprising was directed. 90 91 35 4. The father, in visible anguish, did not disagree with this analysis and called his son an “abused victim;” 5. Kotleba also asserted another conspiracy, i.e., that the attack was a false flag act perpetrated by the Slovak security services who allegedly staged everything to prepare the country for a socio-political earthquake, akin to the 2018 murder of investigative journalist Ján Kuciak and his fiancée, Martina Kušnírová. 92 The event galvanized Slovakia’s center-right opposition and led to its electoral victories in the presidential election and the European elections of 2019, and finally the parliamentary election of 2020. Kotleba opined that a similar scenario was at play in October 2022–however, the victim, unlike in 2018, had not been the ruling establishment of the country but the “traditionalists” and “conservatives.” According to Kotleba, those individuals were blamed for this act of violence in anticipation of the upcoming local elections on October 29, 2022. Ultimately, the far-right did not receive many votes in that election.93 While both parties professed respect for members of the Slovakian LGBTQ+ community, they also discussed how they felt about not being sure “what to call them.” They also acknowledged the “liberal song” amounts to “political abuse” of their political milieu. They vehemently rejected an “extremist” label for the far-right Vlast’ (Homeland) political party, instead portraying it as a regular political party in their view. Even with a clear far-right influence in Juraj Krajčík’s familial dynamic, he managed to exceed the extreme in Slovakia by attaching himself to the Terrorgram community. In addition, despite the presence of key accelerationist figures like Slovakbro (alias) in Slovakia,94 Krajčík’s attack on the Tepláreň bar in Bratislava represents a relative abnormality for the manifestation of far-right violence in the country. Ultimately, Krajčík’s TVM and decision to target a gay bar appears to be less a product of his family’s involvement in far-right politics and more closely tied to his radicalization within Terrorgram where a dramatic increase in discourse targeting LGBTQ+ persons by neofascist accelerationists in the United States has occurred. Instead, Krajčík’s radicalization pathway demonstrates the significant influence of American politics, especially its subcultures of racially and ethnically motivated violence that are present in the transnational ecosystem of militant accelerationism. “Všetko o Vražde Jána Kuciaka: Talianska Mafia Na Slovensku,” Aktuality.sk (Aktuality, n.d.), https://www.aktuality.sk/vrazda-jana-kuciaka/. 93 This was augmented by the electoral system which saw voters elect members of their local parliament in self-governing regions of Slovakia via small constituencies returning low numbers of elected representatives. In such conditions, parties of the extreme right, just like in the first past the post electoral district, face an uphill battle and see a smaller percentage of their members elected. For an election outcome analysis, see https://spravy.pravda.sk/regionalne-volby-2022/clanok/645628-tvrdy-padextremistov-nepomohla-im-ani-spolupraca-so-smerom-no-ukazali-svojpotencial/?utm_source=pravda&utm_medium=hp-box&utm_campaign=shp_3clanok_box; Petit Press, “Výsledky Komunálnych Volieb 2022 - Primátori, Starostovia, Poslanci,” volby.sme.sk (SME, 2022), https://volby.sme.sk/komunalne-volby/2022/vysledky. 94 “Extremist Content Online: ISIS Bomb-Making Video, Guides on Manufacturing Chemical and Biological Weapons, Removed from the Internet Archive,” Counter Extremism Project (Counter Extremism Project, November 22, 2022), https://www.counterextremism.com/press/extremist-contentonline-isis-bomb-making-video-guides-manufacturing-chemical-and-biological. 92 36 Our findings suggest that Krajčík’s TVM, A call to arms, was likely co-authored with another individual. Given the close association with Telegram’s accelerationist ecosystem Terrorgram, it is logical to conclude that the second author also holds a connection to that space. While the attack was perpetrated solely by Krajčík, a forensic linguistic analysis of the manifesto and indicators within his pre-attack Twitter posts and post-attack 4chan correspondence suggest that he was potentially not the sole author of the TVM. Interestingly enough, those same linguistic indicators are apparent in the Twitter feed attributed to Krajčík, suggesting that a second individual may have also had access to, and used, his account. Absent hard evidence from Twitter or some other form of secondary support, this theory remains a working hypothesis based on the analysis of the only text corpus available to the authors. However, if a second author did contribute to the TVM or the social media content, this would be a stark departure from the norm for far-right or accelerationist mass shooters. Given the bi-directional signaling between Krajčík via his TVM and the Terrorgram channels that promote Terrorgram Collective publications via supportive posts after his attack, as well as the rapid adoption of Krajčík as a Saint and “disciple of Tarrant,” it is a viable theory. In considering this, Krajčík’s father may have been partially correct when claiming his son was manipulated, though not in the way that he is seeking to remove the responsibility of terrorism from his son’s actions. A second author suggests that Krajčík was potentially groomed or guided along his mobilization to violence. If that second author also holds a connection to Terrorgram as suspected, it would suggest that the Terrorgram community is taking on a semblance of a command-and-control functionality. Thus, moving accelerationist terrorism towards a threat matrix footing more akin to that of ISIS’s remote attacks on targets in the West, rather than pure stochastic violence emanating from individual radicalization pathways premised on consumption of TVMs and propaganda. Irrespective of whether there were multiple authors or a sole writer, A call to arms stands out as far more sophisticated in its linguistic style and strategic framework compared to other native English-speaking authors. In comparison to Tarrant’s TVM, The Great Replacement, Krajčík’s discussion of the three prongs of militant accelerationism and the varied ways in which an individual can become involved in the “struggle” against the System demonstrates how each new attacker has copied and iterated upon their predecessors’ vile legacy, expanding the lore and mythology for the next wave of attackers. While accelerationist mass shooters and Saints have predominantly manifested in North America since Tarrant, Krajčík’s attack illustrates that this terror threat is a global trend that can easily emerge from unanticipated communities, cultural trends, and individuals–the current perpetrator’s background demonstrates this dynamic well. While clearly influenced by a politically active farright father, his ideological justification in A call to arms is a stark departure from the political dynamics of the far-right in his own community, and is far more familiar to the pan-Aryan frameworks proffered by key American neofascists in recent decades. It also demonstrates the central role that encrypted communication forums play in the radicalization process of individuals associated with the digital militant accelerationism ecosystem. Despite a clear change in Terrorgram’s leadership and routine takedowns and false 37 starts by emerging Terrorgram networks since 2019, there is obviously a critical enough mass of activity and actors to facilitate the perpetuation of the Saints’ model that generates new attacks.95 Additionally, with Krajčík’s TVM and social media content representing such clear American influence, even outside of the suspected second author’s likely American identity, it speaks volumes to the transnational and cross-cultural appeal of militant accelerationism. 95 Deeba Shadnia et al., “Militant Accelerationism Coalitions: A Case Study in Neo-Fascist Accelerationist Coalition Building Online,” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (Center on Terrorism, Extremism, and Counterterrorism - Tech Against Terrorism, July 26, 2022), https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/academics/centers-initiatives/ctec/ctec-publications/militantaccelerationism-coalitions-case-study. 38