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Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The
Middle East And The Perceptions In Syria And
Lebanon*
Türkiye’nin Yeni Orta Doğu Politikası Ve Suriye İle
Lübnan’daki Algılamalar
Tayyar Arı** - Ferhat Pirinççi***
Abstract
The issues in the Middle East directly affect Turkey’s interests from security to economy. However, during the Cold War, Turkey did not involve directly and influentially to the Middle Eastern affairs. The political atmosphere arose after the Cold War, especially in the beginning 2000s, gave some
opportunity and/or encouraged Turkish decision makers to pursue a new policy. Turkey as it develops
and continues its relations with the West and the rest of the World, tried to set a new model of relations
depend on mutual respect, recognition of territorial integrity and constructing trust building relations
with the regional countries in every level. This article focuses on Turkish new foreign policy toward the
Middle East and reflects the perceptions in Syria and Lebanon. From these perceptions, the article claims
that Turkish new diplomatic initiatives would likely to continue and will be appreciated by all sides as
long as the search for stability in the region prevails.
Key Words: Turkey’s Middle East Policy, Turkish Foreign Policy, Turkish-Syrian Relations,
Turkey-Lebanese Relations, Perception of Turkey in the Middle East
Özet
Orta Doğu’daki gelişmeler güvenlikten ekonomiye Türkiye’nin çıkarlarını doğrudan etkilemektedir. Bununla beraber Türkiye Soğuk Savaş döneminde Orta Doğu’daki gelişmelere doğrudan ve
etkili bir şekilde müdahil olmamıştır. Soğuk Savaş sonrasında oluşan yeni siyasi ortam ve özellikle de
2000’li yıllar, Türkiye’nin farklı politikalar izlemesine olanak sağlamış ve/veya karar vericileri bu konuda cesaretlendirmiştir. Yeni dönemde Türkiye bir yandan Batı ve dünyanın diğer bölgeleriyle ilişkilerini
sürdürüp geliştirirken, diğer yandan Orta Doğu ülkeleriyle hemen hemen her seviyede karşılıklı saygıya, toprak bütünlüğüne ve güvene dayalı yeni bir ilişki modeli oluşturmaya çalışmıştır. Bu çalışma,
Türkiye’nin yeni Orta Doğu politikası ve bu politikanın Suriye ve Lübnan’daki algılamaları üzerinde
durmaktadır. Bu algılamalardan hareketle makale, Türkiye’nin bölgeye yönelik yeni diplomatik girişimlerinin süreceğini ve bölgede istikrar arayışı sürdükçe, bu girişimlerin bütün kesimler tarafından
takdir edileceğini iddia etmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Türkiye’nin Orta Doğu Politikası, Türk Dış Politikası, Türkiye-Suriye
İlişkileri, Türkiye-Lübnan İlişkileri, Orta Doğu’daki Türkiye Algısı
*An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Annual Conference of International Studies
Association – West, September 25, 2009.
**Prof.Dr.,Uludag University Department of International Relations, e-mail: atayyar@uludag.edu.tr
***Dr.,Uludag University Department of International Relations, e-mail: ferhat@uludag.edu.tr
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Introduction
For a long time, Turkey, especially during the Cold War years ignored the East
or the Middle East due to some conjunctural and/or ideological reasons despite the fact that the Middle East and Turkey has historical, physical and cultural bounds. However the West and/or Westernization had been basic policy
orientation for Turkey in terms of security and political considerations. In
those years, the security situation stemmed from the structure of international
system imposed Turkey to take the Western consideration in dealing the problems in the Middle East. Post Cold War developments gave some opportunity
for Turkey and the Middle Eastern countries to reevaluate the political consideration and historical misperceptions and develop new types of engagements
with each other. And still Turkey has strategic, political and economic reasons
to construct intense relations with the region.
However, as a result of internal and external changes, especially after
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Turkish foreign
policy has been reshaped by new political decision makers. Surely, the political conditions arose after 2003, gave some opportunity and/or encouraged the
political leaders to pursue a new policy. In this atmosphere, Turkey tried to set
a new model of relations depend on mutual understanding, mutual respect,
recognition of territorial integrity and constructing trust building relations
with the regional countries in every level.
In this article the basic principles of Turkish new foreign policy and the
relations with Syria and Lebanon as well as the perceptions of new Turkish
foreign policy in the Middle East will be analyzed.
I. Background of Turkish Engagement to the Middle East
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Turkey has made an unchallengeable impression on the Middle Eastern countries as well as on the third parties with her active foreign policies and regional engagement in recent years. Turkey gave importance to the relations
with Europe symbolized as “West” rather than the Middle East symbolized as
“East” Even there were historical, religious and cultural links remained behind
the demise of the Ottomans, the modern Turkey preferred not to involve and
familiarize itself with the Middle East. On the other hand, the states, founded
after the withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the Middle East were not so
independent: Syria and Lebanon were under the French mandate while Iraq
and Jordan were under British. The political structures and identities of these
states were mainly determined by the mandates and the “other” created to construct self consciousness depended heavily on anti-Turkish sentiments.
Although the consequences of the World War II created a new atmosphere different from the past; Turkey still did not involve necessarily to the
Middle Eastern affairs. Even one consequence of the new era for the Middle
East was the breaking off the relations with the mandatory powers, the bipolar
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions in Syria And Lebanon
system and the Cold War determined the basic structures of the relations. Taking side with the Western bloc, Turkey evaluated its security policies through
the Soviet expansionism and pursued its foreign policy through the perspectives of West. Even the Palestinian issue and the Arab-Israeli wars as well as
the Iran-Iraq war which lasted eight years, Turkey maintained to pursue the
policy of non-interference and non-involvement in Middle Eastern conflicts.
So, in the Cold War era the main attitude that underlined the relations is the
bipolar system not the self interests. But with the end of the Cold War there
were systemic and geographical changes that Turkey and regional countries
had to re-evaluate their positions.
In the early years of the post-Cold War era, still the Cold War discourse has
taken the minds of the regional countries as hostage and some specific developments drove the attention of the region to the security related topics. In
other words, Turkey and other regional countries had to resume the relations
mostly on security basis and this prevented to enhance the relations not only
in political dimension but also economic and cultural bases. For Turkey, the
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the developments thereafter is closely linked with
the terrorist activities of the separatist PKK and in the 1990s, Turkey had to
give most of its energy on this issue. In this era Turkey preserved to continue
its traditional reactive policy to the regional developments and did not take
active steps and made initiatives to change the structure of the game for its
own interest by employing diplomatic and/or other necessary instruments.
II. Turkey’s New Activism in the Middle East: Basic Features and Causes
The issues of the Middle East directly affect Turkey’s interests from security
to economy. The relative costs of traditional policies were so high that in the
beginning of 2000s Turkey can no longer pursue a non-involvement policy.
Regarding the Middle East that once known very well, Turkey has the potential
to drive the regional trends and establish friendly relations among the regional
countries in order to solve the existing problems while protecting its interests.
First of all, it should be noted that Turkish foreign policy goals towards the
region are mainly strategic and depend on to develop mutual trust and mutual
respect. In other words, Turkish policy makers are focusing on some certain
points as maintaining regional stability, protecting national unity and territorial integrity,
expanding trade relationship, developing friendly and peaceful relations built on trust rather
than mutual suspicions.
In order to understand new characteristics of Turkish policy, the main
principles should be analyzed. These principles can be summarized under five
headlines.
First, Turkey started to pursue a multi-dimensional diplomacy. In the
Cold War and early years of the post-Cold War the ideological factors and
mutual suspicions determined the limits of the engagement. Namely, Turkey
pursued a foreign policy that serves bloc interests even it was controversial
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to its own. But with the end of Cold War effects, Turkey started to develop
diplomacy on mutual and multilateral basis. This means not only taking part
with one side but developing the diplomatic relations with almost all actors.
Regarding Lebanon, Turkey established diplomatic contacts with all groups
notably Shiites and Sunnis that all appreciate Turkish peace efforts and welcome the Turkish troops in UNIFIL after the Israeli attacks in 2006.1 On the
multilateral level, conclusion of a Framework Agreement with the Arab League
to institutionalize the relations and cooperation through the establishment
of a Turkish-Arab Cooperation Forum in 2007 and improve the Strategic Dialogue with
the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) into a structured framework in 2008 are both
examples of the new era2. Thus, multi-dimensional diplomacy enables Turkey
to complement the issues with each other and bring peaceful approaches to
the tough problems.
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Second feature of the new active foreign policy is the positive engagement. This principle has two aspects. First, with its outstanding military power
in the Middle East regional balance Turkey, initially uses and insists diplomatic means to solve the problems. But the diplomatic means to find solutions to the issues sometimes accompanied with coercion or deterrence. May
be the last example of this attitude was in 1998 when Turkey achieved to stop
the Syrian support of PKK after amassing 10,000 additional troops to the border. In the new era, threatening the use of force gave its privileged place to the
positive engagement. This wouldn’t mean that Turkey quit its deterrent force.
Rather, this would mean a positive attitude taken towards all sides even it
has a problematic past. According to the second aspect of this kind of policy
principle, Turkey pursues positive engagement not only with neighboring but
all the countries wherever the world that is to say even with the geographically and politically remote and marginal ones. For example the political and
economic relations of Turkey with the countries such as Oman, UAE, Qatar,
Bahrain and Yemen so developed that was never dreamed before. This situation provides Turkey to be kept informed about the concerns and worries of the
each country even it has a minor role in the regional context. Also this enables
engaging to the problems with acceptable solutions for each part.
Third, Turkey develops sincere and long standing relations. During the
Cold War years as well as in 1990s the relations fluctuated due to the systemic
and political factors. But in the new era Turkey establishes communication
channels and trust building relations to reduce misunderstandings and change
current prejudices with all partners if there exists. The deep relations are not
supposed to construct by only official networks but also unofficial means.
1
2
Also during a visit to the UNIFIL-Turkish military unit in southern Lebanon, Turkish military
staff noted that they were very welcomed and received grateful attitudes from all groups including Shiites.
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/synopsis-of-the-turkish-for eignpolicy.en.mfa, (retrieved 09/02/2009).
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions in Syria And Lebanon
The high level visits and speeches in the press conferences of the Turkish politicians and counterparts indicated that personal relations have been facilitating the establishment of good relations and mutual trust. Also the relations
founded are not limited on governmental level governments. Besides Turkey
engage to all domestic groups in each country without any discrimination and
imperialistic or irredentist aims. Even though the democratic structures of the
Middle Eastern countries make hard the change of the governments, Turkey
has developed relations with the most of the domestic factions depending on
respect.
This can be observed in the changing character of the Turkish foreign
diplomatic missions in the Middle East. Before, they were used to be seen as
ordinary missions that execute the regular official foreign relations. But recently the Turkish diplomats established so effective network that are keep in
touch with almost every group in that country. For example through these efforts, Turkish diplomats easily manage the evacuation of Turkish citizens from
Beirut during the Lebanon crisis in 2008 while other foreign diplomats had had
some difficulties.3
Fourth, Turkey develops an independent foreign policy. Nevertheless,
under the shadow of Cold War Turkey exaggerated the threat perception and
without any precondition, gave full support to Western foreign policy approaches. Therefore, for a long time, Turkey was perceived in the Middle East
as a “gendarme of the West” and the USA in particular. This perception did not
disappeared immediately despite the end of the Cold War. But some foreign
policy initiatives caused the total removal of this perception. In this context
the divergence between U.S. and Turkey regarding Iraq pinned the new perception towards Turkey.4 And of course Turkish reactions towards Israel in the
light of Gaza war and storming out of the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan after a heated debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres in the Davos
Summit in January 2009 burnished this perception. So, acknowledging of the
Middle Eastern countries that Turkish initiatives are free from American or European interests make their approach more positive towards Turkey.
Fifth, Turkey started to evaluate the problems in “win-win strategy”.
Deriving from game theory the win-win strategy means that both sides would
have benefits from cooperation. Emphasized many times by the Turkish Prime
Minister Erdogan, the issues are taken on a win-win basis. In this context the
old hostilities as well as the new ones tried to be overcome not by power or
intimidation but compromise. With this strategy in mind, Turkey emphasizes
3
4
Interview with Turkish Ambassador Serdar Kılıç, Beirut, 08/26/2008.
Even the rapprochement between Turkey and some Middle Eastern states started before, rejection of Turkish Parliament the motion to allow American troops to use Turkish territory on
March 1, 2003 was more appreciated in the Middle East. In the field research, almost everybody from politicians and academicians to ordinary people consider this event as the starting
point of Turkish new stance in the Middle Eastern affairs.
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that regional stability is on behalf of everyone and with the solution of the
problems from bilateral to multilateral including the key problems like Palestine issue, the region would benefit whole.
At the same time, soft power of Turkey accompanied and facilitated
Turkish new stance in the Middle East. In fact, it can be argued that the Turkish dramas and films as soft power elements changed the Turkish image and
influenced perceptions toward Turkey in the Arab Middle East. Before the field
research the authors of this paper can only make some simple assumptions
about the popularity of these series and admiration of “Turkish way of life” in
the region by observing the Arab online media and thought that these would
facilitate to improve relations.5 Cards and posters of the artists of these series
are being sold in the streets of the whole Arab cities. Even it’s difficult to find
these ones in Turkish cities, you may see the posters not only in Damascus and
Beirut but also in Hums, Hama, Tripoli, Saida or Latakia.6
Moreover, some other features of new Turkish activism accompanied
the principles mentioned above. Among these are zero problem with neighbors, independent approach to the dependent cases, avoiding from irredentist
aims and not making discrimination among the countries and groups whether
on ideological, ethnic or religious basis.
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All these features enable Turkey to become the most prominent actor
of the region. It is defined as the “major regional power” or “regional super power” in
most of the interviews made in the Middle East and there are a lot of articles
emphasizing Turkey’s active regional role as a mediator not only Israeli-Syrian case but also in Lebanon crisis, Iraq-Syrian crisis, Iran’s nuclear efforts,
Hamas-PLO dispute…etc.7 So that, especially after the Davos Summit, Mshari
Al-Zaydi from the London based Asharq al Awsat wrote an article which emphasizes the new Turkish activism in the Middle East with the title of “The Return of the Ottoman Empire”. In his article Al-Zaydi wrote “Turkey is now turning
towards its Ottoman past after neglecting it for so long; … to establish an effective presence
for the Turkish state that suits its historical, political and economic significance in the region.”8
Stephen Larrabee a Turkey specialist from the Rand Corporation quoted “…a
significant shift in the country’s foreign policy has gone largely unnoticed: After decades of passivity, Turkey is now emerging as an important diplomatic
5
6
7
8
For example see Asharq al Awsat, “Turkish Drama Series Gain Popularity in Arab World”, http://
www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=7&id=12568, (retrieved 04/27/2006); Rana Moussaoui, ‘Subversive’ Turkish TV Series Takes Arab World by Storm”, http://www.france24.com/
en/20080825-subversive-turkish-tv-series-takes-arab-world-storm, (retrieved 09/14/2008);
Lebanon Daily Star,” Turkish Soaps Revive Arab Interest in the Capital of the Ottomans ”http://
www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=4&article_id=105477, (retrieved
08/22/2009).
Observations in Lebanon and Syria in Summer 2008 and 2009.
For example see Simon Tisdall, “Turkey’s Decisive Role”, The Guardian, January 19, 2009.
See Mshari Al-Zaydi, “The Return of the Ottoman Empire”, Asharq Alawsat, 02/05/2009, http://
www.aawsat.com/english/news.asp?section=2&id=15618, (retrieved 02/08/2009).
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions in Syria And Lebanon
actor in the Middle East.” in Foreign Affairs and named the new Turkish activism as “Rediscovering the Middle East”.9
New Turkish activism in the Middle East is not a spontaneous and independent action from the facts. In other words, there are domestic, regional and
global factors lying behind this new policy. Dealing with the domestic ones,
some argue that the new Middle East engagement stems solely from the policies of Justice and Development Party (AK Party -Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
which has a conservative background.10 Thus with the AK Party coming into
power it can be said that the religious sensitivity of the people increased. Turkish people became more engaged in the Middle Eastern politics especially the
Palestine issue. However it’s believed that this is not the only case. Because
even more conservative governments like Refah (Welfare) Party came in to
power before, there wasn’t any engagement like this. However it can be argued
that political stability created a much more distinctive era for foreign policy.
For instance, while there were more than ten governments changed during the
1990s, the ruling AK Party elected first in 2002 is still in power and this stability
enable the continuity in foreign policy as well as in economic policies.11
In this context strategic and geopolitical changes caused this Turkish
posture towards the Middle East as well. As mentioned above with the re-discovering the possible negative consequences of the new strategic landscape,
the regional actors especially Turkey, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and also
Iraq realized that cooperation through bilateral and multilateral channels
would serve best on behalf of their interests. For Turkey, especially the instability stemming from Iraq is vital. Because the chaos broke out after the American invasion of Iraq would cause dissolution and in this case the delicate regional balance would break down. Even some sort of stability assured in Iraq,
the ambiguity about the consequences of the power struggles still prevails.
Consequently, the change in the official and unofficial perceptions of
the region facilitated the Turkish engagement. During the interviews, most of
the intellectuals and decision makers “unofficially” quoted their disturbance
towards American policies and they also made a deliberate distinction with
these policies and the Turkish stance.12 In this sense, the divergence of the
policies of Washington and Ankara not only helped the transformation of perceptions towards Turkey but also created an independent room to maneuver
for Turkey in the Middle East. This assumption is more meaningful when you
consider that the regional issues would be solved by the initiatives and wills
9 Stephen Larrabee, “Turkey Rediscovers the Middle East”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2007.
10 Interview with Anat Lapidot-Firilla, Jerusalem-Israel, 06/10/2009; Ofra Bengio, Tel Aviv-Israel,
06/11/2009.
11 For the changing nature of Turkish governments see http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/hukumetler /hukumetler.htm, (retrieved 07/15/2009).
12 Especially Syrian, Palestinian, Iranian and Lebanese intellectuals share this view while some
of the Egyptian and Jordanians and none of the Israelis do.
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of the region first just because regional powers may regard the sensitivities of
each actor more. The critical situation of some regional countries also positively affected the Turkish activism in the region. The possible negative consequences of Iraq plus the isolation and problematic relations of Syria and Iran
with the U.S. caused these countries to be more open to regional cooperation.
Thereby, Turkey did not have to endeavor to gain support of these countries for
regional and bilateral cooperation.
Moreover, the economic factors inspired Turkish new engagement to
the Middle East. Even though Turkey had economic relations with some neighboring countries especially with Syria, Iraq and Iran, these were largely characterized through the border trade and could not be compared with the share
of Turkey’s other trade partners.13 But in the new era the needs for Turkish
economic growth stimulated to search new markets and it’s seen that there
were nearly nothing invested in the Middle East market. So, the rapid growth
in Turkish economy brought the new investments in the Middle East and the
trade volume with the region so increased that never can be compared with
the past. The improving economic relations and the political ones sometimes
reciprocally accompanied and facilitated the engagement and encouraged
each other.
III. Turkish – Syrian Rapprochement: Old Foes, New Friends
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Relations with Syria were one of the most problematic issues for Turkish foreign and security policy in the pre WW-II as well as in the Cold War era. The
creation process of “self” in both countries against “other” and accession of
Hatay (Alexandrette- a sanjak in Ottoman era) to Turkey in 1939 were the main
sources of hostility in the pre-WW-II period. The Turkish recognition of Israel
and the Cold War included new ideological problems for reviving the relations.
Also the water issue was one of the most problematic issues for Syria. For a
long time, in order to balance the Turkish power Damascus had used the water
and PKK issues as a political leverage against Turkey.14 Beyond the terrorist
bases located in Bika’a valley, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan lived in Damascus
with the approval of Hafez Assad regime until 1998. When the terrorist attacks
of the PKK became intolerable, Turkey started to make pressure upon Assad
regime. At the last resort in order to deter the Syrian government harbouring
PKK and its leader, Turkish government threatened to use military power. Ankara government transferred certain amount of Turkish soldier to Syrian border
to acknowledge and increase the credibility of political stand.
13 This can be truely understood when the data in the Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Trade
examined. See. http://www.dtm.gov.tr, (retrieved 07/15/2009).
14 Syria also gave support to Armenian terrorist organization ASALA and some leftist terrorist
groups (i.e. Dev Sol) from Turkey in the 1980’s.
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions in Syria And Lebanon
Even the relations came to the edge of a war, Syrian side retreated and with
the signing of the Adana Accords on October 20, 1998 a new era for the relations started.15
Adana accord was the first turning point for Turkish-Syrian relations but
the second one was the attendance of former Turkish President Ahmet Necdet
Sezer to the funeral of Hafez Assad in 2000. The last one also influenced the
Syrian public opinion but, these were not perceived immediately as the signs
of a radical change of Turkish foreign policy toward the region. Its impact was
not seen as a positive change for Turkish foreign policy; however, this gesture has attracted the Syrians so much that during the interviews, most of
the intellectuals take Sezer’s attendance to the funeral as the starting point
for rapprochement. In response, Bashar Assad paid a visit in 2004. This visit
reflected a turning point for the bilateral relations. Thus, Bashar is the first Syrian president who visited the neighboring country, Turkey since the creation
of Syria. Actually the first visit by a Syrian President made in 2004 shows the
background of the relations in an ironic way. But under the shadow of Iraqi
invasion and its possible negative effects, both sides took mutual steps to
strengthen the relations.
In the interviews made, it’s obvious that Turkey’s support for Syria in
2005 was also a crucial step which cemented the rapprochement. However
Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan paid a visit to Damascus in late 2004,
Syrians perceive Sezer’s visit as a breaking point for the isolation of Syria. Because the visit was made while Syria was under heavy pressure for the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Refiq Hariri and its involvement in Lebanon affairs as well as in Iraq and despite the American criticism.
Certainly Turkish support for Syria is not only for Syrian interests. Thus,
the situation in Iraq was becoming worse and Turkish-American relations also
became tense due to the American support to Iraqi Kurds. Americans were
supporting Kurdish groups in order to stabilize Iraq on the one hand; but were
reluctant to give support to Turkey in order to fight against PKK terrorism on
the other hand. Under the shadow of these developments putting heavy pressure on Damascus would mean giving way to another intervention to the regional balance. That’s why Turkey showed solidarity with Syria in order to stabilize the situation and send U.S. a message. But whatever the Turkish aims
are the fact is that Syrians are very grateful for the support. Talking about the
rapprochement, Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister Abdel Fatah Ammura quoted
“Syrians would not forget Turkish support gave in rough times.”16
15 For the background of relations see Malik Mufti, “Turkish-Syrian Rapprochement: Causes and
Consequences”, Policy Watch, No. 630, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 21,
2002; Sami Moubayid, “Turkish-Syrian Relations: The Erdoğan Legacy”, SETA Policy Brief, No.
25, October 2008, pp. 1-3.
16 Interview with Abdel Fatah Ammura, Damascus, 08/19/2008.
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After than the mutual visits took place consecutively and the political
as well as economic and cultural relations improved. In the end of first decade
of 2000s, there is nothing seen to mention as a problematic issue between two
countries. For instance talking about Hatay, however the Turkish province Hatay is still shown in some Syrian maps as a part of Syrian territory it’s claimed
that Damascus implicitly recognized the current borders but couldn’t declare
it loudly due to the Israeli efforts to create similarity between Hatay and Golan.17 Actually the Hatay issue has never mentioned by the Syrians during the
intense interviews made on Turkish-Syrian relations. When the Syrian Ministry
of Tourism’s website examined, it can be seen that a “practical” solution found
in order not to undermine the ongoing relations.18
Improvement in the political relations accompanied the economic ones
and Turkish-Syrian trade volume increased as well. According to Turkish Undersecretary of Foreign Trade data while in 2004 the official trade volume was
about $ 0.75 billion, it exceeded $ 1.750 billion in 2008. Also cooperation in the
oil field started with the Turkish state owned TPIC and Syrian counterparts. Beside the welling cooperation in 2006-2007 TPIC began importing and exporting
various oil products as well as crude oil since 2008. Adil Beyatli, TPIC representative in Damascus quoted that Turkish and Syrian companies are working on
new projects that would facilitate the economic cooperation.19
Certainly some events show the level of cooperation between two old
foes. One of them is Turkey’s mediation effort in Syrian-Israeli indirect peace
talks. This initiative was held secretly first and then publicized with both sides’
content. However the process failed due to the Israeli attack on Gaza, Beshar
Assad stated that “two sides never came so close for a settlement before even in 1990”.
After this process, on the face of new negotiation attempts Syria is insisting
for the Turkish mediation. Just before a special visit to Turkey, Assad said20:
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“Turkey’s role is a very fundamental one. There are many reasons for this. As a
country in this region, Turkey is more concerned with every aspect of this land than any other
country. Turkey is a very skillful country both in its efforts to solve problems and in removing
obstacles that lead to problems. Secondly, there is unconditional trust between Syria and Turkey both at the political level and between the peoples, and this is very important for us. There
is no mistrust on any issue. Furthermore, Turkey has proven in a short period of eight months
how skilful and rational it is in mediating, although this was Turkey’s first effort concerning
the Arab problem.” Assad concluded his words as “…we always want to shift to direct
meetings once we reach a certain point through indirect meetings with Turkey’s mediation”.
17 See Hurriyet, “Secret Solution to Hatay”, 01/10/2005.
18 Syrian Ministry of Tourism put a touristic image on the Turkish-Syrian border. In the map
it’s not clear if it’s a Turkish or Syrian territory. See http://www.syriatourism.org/index.
php?newlang=eng, (retrieved 08/14/2009)
19 Interview with Adil Beyatli Head of TPIC Damascus Branch Office, 08/23/2008.
20 http://www.champress.net/index.php?q=en/Article/view/44473, (retrieved 09/16/2009).
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions in Syria And Lebanon
Other event is the joint military exercise staged on April 27, 2009. However the scope was limited; this exercise was so significant that it was the
first military engagement of both sides. More importantly on the same day
Turkey and Syria signed a technical military cooperation agreement to deepen
collaboration between the national defense industries.21 Another important
development was held on September 16, 2009. During Syrian delegations’ visit
headed by Assad, an agreement for canceling entry visas and another one for
establishing High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council is signed. The latter is
very wide including not only political, diplomatic, and economic aspects but
also transportation, energy and water sources, environment, culture, education, and science issues.22
In this context, the second High Level Strategic Cooperation meeting
was held on October 2-3, 2010 in Latakia with the attendance of Syrian and
Turkish cabinet members including the foreign and interior ministers as well
as ministers of energy, foreign trade, environment, agriculture, transportation,
health and housing. This meeting has shown the increase of the scale of relations so that, it’s not easy to find such active cooperation mechanism neither
in the region nor in the world. As Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs told during
the meeting, “Our relations are beyond what existing models of cooperation offer. This is the
first time that two countries are engaging in a cooperation mechanism of this level that sets no
boundaries to improving their relations”23 As the participants of the meetings show,
politics is not the only issue discussed. In the meetings several agreements
were signed from agriculture to transportation including for the foundation of
a joint venture oil company to search oil in Syrian soil.24
To sum up, the relations on the edge of a war in 1998 transformed to
a strategic cooperation which stems from Turkish active policies and Syrian
response. In ten years both countries became aware of their mutual interests.
But it must be stated that in this relationship, Syria needs Turkey more than
Turkey needs. In other words Syria needs Turkey in order to solve its individual
problems as well as enjoying the regional stability. Dr. Samir al Taqi, Director
of the Orient Center for International Studies in Damascus quotes that “when
the Syrians think about war, they turn to Iran but when they think peace and opportunities
they turn to Turkey”25 However, Syrians officially state that the relations is yielding for both sides. According to Abdel Fatah Ammura, “while Syria finds opportu21 Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak defined the exercise as a “disturbing development” See http://
www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3707314,00.html, (retrieved 05/30/2009).
22 http://www.champress.net/index.php?q=en/Article/view/44490, (retrieved 09/16/2009).
23 “High-Level Turkish-Syrian Meeting Kicks off in Latakia”, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.
com/n.php?n=high-level-turkish-syrian-meeting-kicks-off-in-latakia-2010-10-03,
(retrieved
10/10/2010).
24 The first clue of this initiative was pointed out by Adil Beyatlı in an interview made on
8/28/2008. See “TPAO Suriye’de Petrol Arayacak”, http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25137670, (retrieved 10/07/2010).
25 Interview with Samir al Taqi, Damascus, 08/22/2008.
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nity to reach West through Turkey; Turkey also finds opportunity to reach the rest of the Arab
world through Syria.”26 Whether this assumption is true or not, it’s obvious from
the interviews that Syrians are sincere towards Turkey and believe that the
cooperation would bring benefits for each side. For their part, besides uniting
Syria to the West, the economic profits of this relation are also regarded. Thus,
perception of Syrians toward Turkish way of economic development is also an
important attractive factor which accelerates all other processes.27
IV. Turkish – Lebanese Rapprochement: A Sample of Turkish Activism
Turkey’s engagement to Lebanon is a good example of Turkish activism in the
region. Thus, Turkish engagement in Syria, Iran and Iraq is understandable due
to the fact that these are neighboring countries and they have a potential as
buffer zones for blocking the instability derived from the region. Also Turkish
engagement in the countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt may be understandable due to the fact that these are other major powers of the region. But the
engagement in Lebanon needs more explanation. Because of its geographically remote location, Lebanon wasn’t perceived as a vital area for Turkish foreign and security policy. But with the 2000s there is a transformation in this
perception and Turkish concern over Lebanon steadily increased.
Lebanon can be seen as a “micro Middle East” with its complex political,
social and cultural structure. And because of this complexity the major powers
in the Middle East as well as in the global order take side with one or more of
the ethnic or religious factions in order to influence and gain profit in the local
power struggle.28 This process has started in the late years of the Ottoman Empire and after its demise, modern Turkey had never taken part in these power
struggles. Even in the early years of the post-Cold War era, Turkish-Lebanese
relations were executed on official and conventional basis just as with the
other countries like Yemen, Sudan or Morocco.
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However with the start of Turkish activism, Lebanon is also considered
as an important area for the regional stability. Thus, the struggle among the
regional and global actors through Lebanese groups has seen as a big source
of instability for the region. In this context an intervention to Lebanese affairs
on behalf of one group usually balanced or responded with an intervention by
another regional/global actor and the process transform itself from local to
regional power struggle. This situation could not be acceptable for Turkey. In
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s words “stability in Lebanon will affect
whole Middle East”.29 The other way around is also a prevailing assumption.
26 Interview with Abdel Fatah Ammura, Damascus, 08/19/2008.
27 Interview with Mervan Kabalan, Damascus University, 08/24/2008.
28 For the power struggles in modern Lebanon see Fawwaz Traboulsi, A History of Modern Lebanon,
London: Pluto Press, 2007.
29 http://www.trt.net.tr/trtinternational/en/newsDetail.aspx?HaberKodu=16ba126f-8341-426e9d3a-27480f62eacc, (retrieved 07/19/2009).
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions in Syria And Lebanon
Hence, in 2000’s Turkish-Lebanese relations accelerated with the invitation of assassinated Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2004. But the
turning point for Turkish active engagement is the Israeli attack to Lebanon
in 2006. Turkey while criticizing loudly the Israeli attack also tried to find a
solution for a ceasefire. Since then, in the post-war period Turkey contributed
UN peace force (UNIFIL) with an engineering corps unit located in the south
Lebanon near Tyre (Sur). Also Turkey provided humanitarian aid during and
after the crisis totaling $ 20 million worth and committed additional $ 30 million in the Stockholm and Paris conferences for the reconstruction of Lebanon.
Turkish efforts of reconstruction did not centralized in a specific geographic
or factious location instead scores of schools have built in different parts of
Lebanon.30 Beyond reconstruction efforts, several high level visits made and
Turkey took part on important mediations efforts during the presidential elections and other political crisis between the Lebanese groups.
In the interviews made in Lebanon, it’s observed that most of the Lebanese intellectuals from different factions appreciated Turkish efforts in order
to stabilize the country and are welcoming the new engagements. This is an interesting thing when the same intellectuals usually criticize at least one actor
for their support to the rival group.31 Serdar Kılıç, Turkish Ambassador in Beirut said that “they own this appreciation for their neutral engagement with all groups without any discrimination” and further defined this policy as “honorable neutralism”.32
The Lebanese perceive Turkey as one of the most important actors in
political, economic and military sense. Some argue that Turkey should take
more steps to engage and balance the external interventions. For example
Jamil K. Mroue editor in chief of the Lebanon Daily Star insisted that “Turkey
should be more active in Lebanese affairs”. Mroue went further by claiming that “it’s
difficult to expect the external powers with different interests may bring a just solution to the
crisis” and emphasized the importance of contribution of Turkey with its potential power and neutral stance.33
Pointing out the growing concern to Turkish diplomatic demarches in
the Middle East as well as to Turkish domestic politics is not an extreme observation for Lebanon. Thus, after the Turkish diplomatic maneuvers, major
media corporations assigned journalists solely to observe Turkish diplomatic
initiatives in particular and Turkey in general. One of them was Ernest Khoury
a Palestinian journalist from the Lebanese Al Akhbar Newspaper. While given
30 As of July 2009, while Turkey have built 41 schools and five children parks, two health clinics
and a rehabilitation center is still under construction. See Ahmet Davutoğlu, “Turkey Strives
for a Better Common Future in the Middle East”, Daily Star, 07/31/2009.
31 For example during the interviews, Shiites criticized Saudi and American intervention while
the Sunnis criticized Iranian and Syrian influence and both complained about Israeli policies;
none of them criticized Turkish role in Lebanon.
32 Interview with Turkish Ambassador Serdar Kılıç, Beirut, 08/26/2008.
33 Interview with Jamil K. Mroue in Beirut, 08/27/2008.
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his appreciation to Turkish diplomatic rise in the Middle East and its place
among the Lebanese, Ernest Khoury emphasized the negative consequences
of Turkish initiatives for the Palestinians. Namely, Khoury underlined his hesitations of a possible success of Turkish mediation efforts on Syrian-Israel negotiations and claimed that a “successful” process wouldn’t mean the same for
the Palestinian refugees especially living in Lebanon.34
In the sectarian strife between the pro-Western government and the opposition on May 2008, Lebanon became on brink of a civil war like the one
1975-1990. Turkey at this stage played an active role with Qatar to find a solution to the conflict and to prevent to deepen the crisis. Through these efforts
Doha agreement was signed and a national unity government was formed in
order to maintain stability. The journalists as well as some of the politicians,
who spoke on the condition of anonymity, stated that without Turkey’s efforts
the solution could not be achieved even though Turkish role did not underlined enough in the process. But almost all interviewees also acknowledged
that they perceive Turkey as a stability maker not only for Lebanon but also for
the whole region.35
To sum up, improvement in Turkish-Lebanon relations and the perceptions of Lebanese reflect the success of Turkish activism in the Middle East.
Because Turkish engagement and relations of both countries came to an important stage that in the 1990s and early 2000s there would be nothing to
mention about except the official and superficial dimension of the relations.
This Turkish diplomatic engagement is accompanied with the economic sector
that the trade volume of both countries is steadily increasing. For instance,
the trade volume did not exceed a quarter million dollars in 2003; but exceeded a billion dollars in 2008. It can be argued that, under these circumstances
the Turkish-Lebanon relations will steadily improve and will reflect a good
example of objective engagement and use of political, economical, historical,
cultural and religious links.
Conclusion
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As long as the underlying causes of new Turkish activism in the Middle East,
especially the search for stability prevails, Turkish new diplomatic initiatives
would likely continue. The characteristic of Turkish engagement which differs
itself from the others is certainly its nature. In other words, it’s obviously different from the engagements of Iran or other regional powers. Thus, Turkish
activism is constructed on the desire for regional stability and never aimed to
change regional balance by using military power. However there are some worries of regional decision makers and analysts about the new Turkish activism.
34 Interview with Ernest Khoury, Beirut, 08/28/2009.
35 Interviews made during August 2008.
Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Towards The Middle East And The Perceptions in Syria And Lebanon
Some made their hesitations about the imperial desires of Turkey by calling
the new policy as neo-Ottomanism.
Nevertheless it must be stated that the character of Turkish activism
has not imperialistic desires. The basic motive behind this policy can be explained with: “…if there were something happening in the world that affected Turkey, then
Turkey had a right to speak out and would always exercise this right.”36 Exercising this
right of course needs a strong infrastructure which Turkey likely to acquire. For
instance if the elections for the non-permanent Security Council membership
regarded, Middle Eastern countries supported Turkey’s membership.
Dealing on the reflections of Turkish activism, it’s observed that Turkish new stance is mostly supported in the cases of Syria and Lebanon. In the
regional context, this support would be higher in the streets than the government bureaucracies however the decision makers of Syria and Lebanon are
welcoming and supporting this activism. During the interviews, it’s observed
that neither side confront to the activism, instead they are waiting for additional steps in order to solve their individual problems.
As a consequence Turkey’s new stance in the Middle East is welcomed
and likely to improve as long as the strategic landscape is not changed or Turkey doesn’t retreat itself from the process.
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